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COURT TRANSPARENCY AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
David S. Ardia† 
“Publicity is the very soul of justice,” legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham once 
warned.1 Regrettably, lady justice is at risk of losing her soul. In courts across the 
country, secrecy is increasingly the norm. Indeed, the extent of secrecy in American 
courts is astonishing, especially given the assumption by many that the First 
Amendment guarantees a right of public access to the courts. In reality, the United 
States Supreme Court has explicitly held only that there is a First Amendment right 
of public access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings. The Court has never 
addressed the question of whether there is a constitutional right of access to civil 
proceedings or to court records. Moreover, the Court’s last pronouncement on this 
issue occurred more than a quarter of a century ago and left the lower courts with a 
confusing and inconsistent doctrinal roadmap for dealing with public access 
questions. In the intervening decades, public access to the courts has been quietly 
under siege.  
This is a critical time for court transparency because the courts, like so many 
institutions of government, are in the midst of a transformation from the largely 
paper-based world of the twentieth century to an interconnected, electronic world 
where physical and temporal barriers to information are disappearing. Not 
surprisingly, the shift to electronic access to the courts raises significant privacy 
concerns. As a result of these and other concerns, a number of courts and legislatures 
are considering sharply limiting public access to certain court proceedings and 
records.  
 
 †  Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, and Faculty Co-
Director, UNC Center for Media Law and Policy. Thanks to Heidi Kitrosser, Anne Klinefelter, 
Bill Marshall, Cathy Packer, Mary-Rose Papandrea, and participants at the 2016 Internet Law 
Works-in-Progress Symposium at New York Law School for helpful comments and discussion. 
Thank you also to Patrick Redmon, Maddie Salamone, Robert Sparks, and James Wudel for 
exceptional research assistance. 
 1 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Bentham’s Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments, 
Compared with That of the National Assembly, with a Commentary on the Same, in THE WORKS 
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 305, 316 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1843) 
[hereinafter BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM]. 
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We can, however, put court transparency on a firm theoretical foundation by 
focusing on the structural role the First Amendment plays in our constitutional 
system. In doing so, this Article makes two related arguments. First, a central purpose 
of the First Amendment is to ensure that citizens can effectively participate in and 
contribute to our republican system of self-government. Second, in order to effectuate 
this goal, the First Amendment must be understood to embody an affirmative right of 
access to information held by the courts, which by virtue of their unique institutional 
position possess information that is essential for the public to effectively evaluate the 
workings of government and, therefore, to act as sovereigns over the government. 
Drawing on these conclusions, this Article reworks existing First Amendment 
doctrine to shift the emphasis away from the question of whether experience and 
logic support a public right of access to individual judicial proceedings and records to 
whether the structural benefits of court transparency are outweighed by the need for 
secrecy. This reworking of public access doctrine provides a principled way for courts 
to evaluate the interests in secrecy while at the same time ensuring that the public’s 
right of access to the courts is retained. 
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In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
published an opinion in a lawsuit that, as far as the public knew, did not 
exist. The case, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc.,2 was kept so secret 
over the course of seven years that it never appeared on a public docket. 
By order of the district court, all proceedings were closed and all records 
were sealed.3 The case, and its extraordinary secrecy, only came to light 
because the Third Circuit issued a decision reversing the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.4 In the 
penultimate paragraph of that decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s sealing of the case, ruling that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion even though he did not provide the public with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on the question of closure and did not issue any 
on-the-record findings supporting his closure order.5 And then, without 
further explanation, the Third Circuit promptly sealed the appellate 
record.6 
 
 2 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir.), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 3 If a member of the public or press attempted to find the case on the district court’s Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system, they would have received a message 
saying either that no such case existed or that it was sealed. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
3, N.Y. Law Publ’g Co. v. Doe, 555 U.S. 1013 (2008) (No. 08-330), 2008 WL 4185426, at *3 
[hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]. 
 4 C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 361–62. 
 5 Id. at 371. 
 6 See Order, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 543 F.3d 178 (2008) (Nos. 06-3625 & 06-4508) 
(order filed on June 19, 2008 denying motion for intervention, for access to records and 
proceedings, and to alter/amend opinion) (the order is available in Appendix B to the Petition 
for Certiorari, supra note 3). The Third Circuit later modified its decision, stating: “It is not our 
intention that the order we entered sealing the record on appeal would prevent the district 
court from considering this issue anew . . . .” C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 543 F.3d at 179. The 
district court did not modify its orders. 
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C.A.R.S. Protection Plus did not involve state secrets or the nation’s 
security. It did not involve confidential police informants or clandestine 
law enforcement practices. It did not involve rape, child abuse, or lurid 
sexual conduct. According to the Third Circuit, the case involved an 
employment discrimination claim under Title VII, as amended by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,7 brought by “Jane Doe,” who alleged 
that her employer fired her because she had an abortion.8 Undoubtedly, 
the case contained sensitive information about the plaintiff’s medical 
treatment and the unsympathetic actions of her employer, a car 
warranty company,9 but such details are common in employment 
discrimination cases.10 
Beyond the basic facts described in the Third Circuit’s opinion, we 
still know very little about this case. Thirteen days after the Third 
Circuit revealed the lawsuit’s existence, the New York Law Publishing 
Company, which publishes the Legal Intelligencer and Pennsylvania Law 
Weekly, sought to intervene in the proceedings and challenge the 
closure and sealing orders.11 After the Third Circuit denied these 
requests, New York Law Publishing filed a petition for certiorari with 
the United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to decide whether 
the blanket sealing of an entire case is constitutional under the First 
Amendment.12 The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari 
without further comment.13 The case eventually settled and remains 
under seal today. 
If the Third Circuit can so casually dismiss public access in an 
employment discrimination case, it prompts the troubling question of 
how many other cases have been litigated in secret. As New York Law 
Publishing asked in its petition for certiorari: “Is there a parallel justice 
system at work here, visible and accountable to no one?”14 This is no 
idle concern. Judges across the country routinely close court 
 
 7 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). 
 8 C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 363. The plaintiff proceeded anonymously under the 
pseudonym “Jane Doe.” See id. at 371 n.2. 
 9 Id. at 362. 
 10 See, e.g., Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that the 
plaintiff’s discrimination claims “placed her medical condition at issue, making the [medical 
records] sought by the [defendant] relevant, and absent a showing of bad faith, discoverable”). 
Medical details are a common enough matter in employment discrimination cases that a 
section on the discoverability of medical records is included in The American Law Institute 
Continuing Legal Education course materials for evidentiary developments in employment 
cases. See Richard T. Seymour, Recurring Discovery and Evidence Problems in Employment 
Cases, SX001 A.L.I.-C.L.E. 529 (2015). 
 11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 4. 
 12 Id. at i. 
 13 N.Y. Law Publ’g Co. v. Doe, 555 U.S. 1013 (2008). 
 14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 15. 
ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2017  6:33 PM 
2017] C O U RT  T R AN S P AR E N C Y  839 
 
proceedings and restrict public access to judicial records, including 
sealing entire cases.15 In recent years, it has come to light that some 
courts have maintained secret dockets containing thousands of cases. 
For example, after the Second Circuit held that the State of Connecticut 
had been improperly sealing cases for decades,16 the State’s courts 
unsealed more than 10,000 cases that utilized secret dockets, most of 
which dealt with divorce or family law issues involving public officials 
and celebrities, including Clarence Clemons, Bruce Springsteen’s former 
saxophonist.17 As surprising as these statistics are, they do not even 
begin to capture the far more common closure and sealing of individual 
court proceedings and records that occur on a daily basis in courts 
across the country.18 
Transparency is essential for the proper functioning of any judicial 
system. As legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham wrote in the early 
nineteenth century, “[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice.”19 Without 
public oversight over the judicial system, Bentham warned, “all other 
checks are insufficient.”20 Public oversight of the courts serves many 
salutary purposes, including ensuring that our system of justice 
functions fairly and is accountable to the public.21 But the benefits of 
court transparency extend far beyond the courthouse. Public access to 
the courts also allows the public to measure and evaluate governmental 
(and private) power. This knowledge produces what Robert Post has 
called “democratic competence,” which enables citizens to engage in 
 
 15 See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 16 Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 17 See Rory Eastburg, Nothing to See Here, NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter 2009, at 34. 
 18 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 629 F. App'x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming district 
court’s order closing courtroom and sealing records associated with pretrial criminal 
proceeding); United States v. Nallani, No. 11-cr-20365, 2016 WL 4138227, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 3, 2016) (ordering redaction of sentencing materials); United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-
93 (VEC), 2016 WL 1572993, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016) (ordering redaction of exhibits 
presented to court during oral argument); United States v. Hoyt, No. 1:15-cr-1, 2016 WL 
776595, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 2016) (ordering redaction of portions of forensic mental 
health evaluation); United States v. Grace, No. CR 05-07-M-DWM, 2009 WL 5697923, at *1 (D. 
Mont. Feb. 27, 2009) (ordering closure of trial testimony of twenty-six witnesses); People v. 
Asturias, No. A137391, 2015 WL 2148710, at *19 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7, 2015) (affirming trial 
court’s closure of courtroom during testimony of minor victim's parents); Commonwealth v. 
White, 33 N.E.3d 1265 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (ordering trial court to consider motion for a new 
trial because jury selection was closed to the public and noting that a “long-time court officer in 
that county had testified during the motion proceedings that the court room was routinely 
closed to the public during general voir dire”). 
 19 BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 316. 
 20 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827) (“Without publicity, 
all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small 
account.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“Public 
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding 
process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.”). 
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self-government, a goal that underlies the First Amendment’s 
commitment to freedom of speech.22 
As C.A.R.S. Protection Plus demonstrates, lady justice is at risk of 
losing her soul. Rather than being an exceptional case, C.A.R.S. 
Protection Plus is emblematic of a court system that too frequently 
devalues transparency. Indeed, the extent of secrecy in American courts 
is astonishing, especially given the assumption by many commentators 
that the First Amendment guarantees a right of public access to the 
courts.23 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly held 
only that there is a First Amendment right of public access to criminal 
trials and criminal trial-like proceedings.24 The Supreme Court has 
never addressed the question of whether there is a constitutional right of 
access to civil proceedings or to court records. Moreover, the Court’s 
last statement on this issue occurred more than a quarter of a century 
ago,25 and left the lower courts with a confusing and inconsistent 
doctrinal roadmap for dealing with public access questions. In the 
intervening decades, public access to the courts—and to government 
information generally—has been quietly under siege. 
Due to the Supreme Court’s shifting pronouncements on whether a 
constitutional right of access to government information exists, public 
access to the courts has been the subject of scholarly attention for 
decades.26 After the attacks on September 11, 2001, however, there was 
 
 22 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 61 (2012) (“The value of democratic 
competence is undermined whenever the state acts to interrupt the communication of 
disciplinary knowledge that might inform the creation of public opinion.”). 
 23 See, e.g., Dan Klau, Opinion, Rebutting Misinformation About Crime Scene Photos and 
FOIA, HERALD (New Britain, Conn.), Oct. 18, 2013, 2013 WLNR 26274091 (“[T]he public has a 
First Amendment right of access to court proceedings and documents, including trial 
exhibits.”); Emma Morehart, Justice Isn’t Served by Secrecy About Death Penalty, TULSA WORLD 
(Apr. 16, 2015, 8:15 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/othervoices/emma-morehart-
justice-isn-t-served-by-secrecy-about-death/article_4d58657a-e2bb-11e4-b394-17413999d
34f.html (“[T]he First Amendment [] demands a right of access to information in the 
government’s hands.”); John Peck, Editorial, Court Records in the Amy Bishop Murder Case 
Must Remain Open, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Ala.) (June 12, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://blog.al.com/
times-views/2011/06/editorial_court_records_in_the.html (“The public and press have a First 
Amendment right of access to court proceedings. That extends to the copious motions, 
countermotions, depositions and other filings in the growing case file.”). 
 24 See discussion infra Section I.A.3. 
 25 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 26 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a 
Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations 
of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 [hereinafter Emerson, Legal Foundations of the 
Right to Know]; G. Michael Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To 
Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1981); Anthony Lewis, A 
Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment As Sword, 1980 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1; Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 
1 (1983); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 
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an especially large outpouring of scholarship and commentary critical of 
the government’s wholesale closure of deportation hearings and other 
adjudications related to the “war on terror.”27 These scholars argued, 
based largely on doctrinal and normative grounds, that the right of 
access to criminal proceedings should be extended to other adjudicatory 
contexts. With few exceptions,28 however, public access advocates have 
not acknowledged that the current doctrinal and theoretical bases for a 
First Amendment right of access are quite weak.  
This Article strives to put court transparency on a firm theoretical 
foundation by focusing on the structural role the First Amendment 
plays in our constitutional system. It begins in Part I by describing the 
constitutional framework for analyzing public access disputes and lays 
bare the incoherence in the lower courts’ application of current 
Supreme Court doctrine. The confusing state of the law on public access 
is particularly evident in civil cases and in disputes over court records, 
but inconsistency pervades the entire body of access law. Indeed, as one 
commentator has noted, incoherence and confusion in the lower courts 
regarding a First Amendment right of access “are troubling not only 
because they lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results, but also 
because such inconsistency suggests that the choice is outcome-
driven.”29 
Part II examines the theories, or justifications, for a First 
Amendment right of access to the courts, noting that a central purpose 
of the First Amendment is to ensure that citizens can effectively 
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-
government.30 Part II also traces the roots of constitutional 
 
105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991); Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made 
in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 177 (2009). 
 27 See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the 
Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004); Raleigh 
Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006); 
Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 461 (2002); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the 
War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35 (2005); Susan Dente Ross, Secrecy’s Assault on the 
Constitutional Right to Open Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 351 (2004).  
 28 See Kitrosser, supra note 27, passim (arguing that access denials to adjudicative 
proceedings are presumptively unconstitutional under a structuralist view of the First 
Amendment); Levine, supra note 27, at 1758–81 (noting the inconsistency and incoherence in 
the lower courts’ approach to access claims). 
 29 Levine, supra note 27, at 1742. 
 30 This theory of the First Amendment is most commonly associated with Alexander 
Meiklejohn. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1960). It is not my contention that this is 
the only purpose underlying the First Amendment. Other purposes are clearly evident in the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, including “advancing knowledge,” 
“discovering truth,” and “assuring individual self-fulfillment.” THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970). I return to these purposes in Part II. 
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structuralism and identifies the structural values of court transparency. 
For First Amendment structuralists, “access denials are significant not 
because they directly restrain speech but because they threaten the 
preconditions of speech facilitative of self-government and the checking 
of government abuse.”31 The judiciary is the most insular branch of our 
government, and public access provides an important source of 
information for citizens to understand how the government exercises 
power across a broad range of societal activities. Without public access 
to such information, not only would the courts lack legitimacy, but our 
democratic system of government would as well. It is this latter point—
that public access to the courts serves essential structural values by 
making self-governance possible—that differentiates the approach in 
this Article from the customary arguments offered in support of public 
access, which rely on the benefits of access to individual court 
proceedings or to the court system.32 
Part II also answers a question that has vexed constitutional 
scholars for decades: Is the First Amendment implicated only when the 
government acts to censor or punish speech, or does the First 
Amendment also require recognition that speech about the government 
must be informed by information from the government? Drawing on 
the Supreme Court’s public access decisions, as well as the work of First 
Amendment theorists, this Article asserts that the First Amendment 
embodies an affirmative obligation on the part of the government to 
ensure that public discussion of the courts is well informed. In order to 
effectuate this goal, the First Amendment must be understood to 
embody a right of access to information held by the courts, which, by 
virtue of their unique institutional position, possess information that is 
essential for the public to effectively evaluate the workings of 
government. 
Part III concludes by recasting public access doctrine in the mold 
of First Amendment structuralism. In doing so, it suggests that rather 
than attempt to evaluate whether public access plays a positive role in a 
particular court proceeding, judges should hold that a First Amendment 
right of access attaches to all court proceedings and records that are 
 
 31 Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 99. 
 32 See, e.g., M.A. “Mike” Kautsch, Press Freedom and Fair Trials in Kansas: How Media and 
the Courts Have Struggled to Resolve Competing Claims of Constitutional Rights, 57 KAN. L. 
REV. 1075, 1085–88 (2009); Marcus, supra note 26, at 41–53; Miller, supra note 26, at 483–90; 
Ross, supra note 27, at 391–92; Smith, supra note 26, at 214–15; Paul Coppock, Article, Doors to 
Remain Open During Business Hours: Maintaining the Media's (and Public's) First Amendment 
Right of Access in the Face of Changing Technology, 58 S.D. L. REV. 319, 337–38 (2013); Nicole J. 
Dulude, Comment, Unlocking America's Courthouse Doors: Restoring a Presumption of First 
Amendment Access as a Means of Reviving Public Faith in the Judiciary, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. 
L. REV. 193, 227–29 (2005). 
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material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power. Recognizing a 
constitutional right of public access does not require, however, that 
court proceedings and records must always be open to the public. When 
the countervailing interests in secrecy are sufficiently compelling, a 
court can limit public access, but it should do so only rarely. 
This recasting of public access doctrine is particularly important 
because courts, like so many institutions of government, are in the midst 
of a transformation from the largely paper-based world of the twentieth 
century to an interconnected, electronic world where physical and 
temporal barriers to information are diminishing. Not surprisingly, the 
shift to electronic access to court proceedings and records can raise 
significant privacy concerns.33 As a result of these concerns, a number of 
courts and legislatures have sharply limited public access to certain 
proceedings and records.34 A reinvigorated public access right grounded 
in a structural interpretation of the First Amendment will help to ensure 
that courts take into account the full range of benefits that come from 
court transparency. 
I.     PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
The idea that the public has an interest in observing the operation 
of the courts is hardly controversial. From at least the time of Roman 
law, trials have been public events, res publica.35 Public access to court 
proceedings has been the rule in England since “time immemorial,”36 
and is regarded there as “one of the essential qualities of a court of 
justice.”37 Indeed, as discussed in the Sections that follow, American 
 
 33 See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical Study, 
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1825–26, 1882–90 (2015) (discussing the wide range of privacy 
interests implicated by public access to the courts). 
 34 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070 (West 2016) (closing juvenile delinquency and 
dependency proceedings); MD. CT. R. 16-906 (listing categories of cases in which court records 
are not publicly accessible, including adoption, guardianship, child abuse, and attorney 
grievance matters); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-2-1323 (West 2009) (sealing records of supervision 
proceedings by the insurance commissioner); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Lᴀᴡ § 160.50(1) (McKinney 
2004) (sealing records in criminal cases decided in favor of the accused); In re J. S., 438 A.2d 
1125, 1131 (Vt. 1981) (“The juvenile shield law does not give the court below discretion to 
make the proceedings public.”). 
 35 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“A trial is a public event. What transpires 
in the court room is public property.”); BRUCE W. FRIER, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS: 
STUDIES IN CICERO’S PRO CAECINA 57–62 (1985) (“[T]he Urban Praetor’s court was set up in 
the open air at the southeastern end of the Forum . . . .”). 
 36 Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting EDWARD 
JENCKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73–74 (Paul B. Fairest ed., 6th ed. 1967)). 
 37 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (quoting Daubney v. 
Cooper (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (KB)). 
ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2017  6:33 PM 
844 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:835 
 
jurists have long recognized that open courts serve many important 
societal interests. 
The conclusion that the public has a First Amendment right to 
access the courts, however, is controversial. Although commentators 
often assume that such a right exists,38 judges and scholars continue to 
debate whether the Constitution requires that the courts be open to the 
public. The disagreement over a First Amendment right of access to the 
courts can be traced to three divergent lines of Supreme Court cases 
addressing a constitutional right of access to government information. 
The first is a series of cases from the 1970s in which the Court held that 
the First Amendment does not prevent the government from restricting 
press access to prisoners and prisons.39 In the second line of cases, the 
Court expanded on its decisions in the prison access cases, holding that 
there is no constitutional right to obtain information from the 
government generally.40 In a third series of cases in the 1980s, however, 
the Court took a decidedly different tack when confronted with the 
question of public access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings.41 
This Part examines the roots of this debate and describes the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional framework for analyzing public access 
claims. It also explores how the lower courts have applied the Supreme 
Court’s doctrinal framework, revealing that many judges are resistant to 
the idea that there is a First Amendment right of access, especially to 
civil proceedings and court records. 
 
 38 See supra note 23. 
 39 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding no 
constitutional violation by county jail that refused to allow press to interview inmates); Saxbe v. 
Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to federal prison 
regulation prohibiting face-to-face interviews by the press); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 
(1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to state prison regulation under which media 
representatives were able to interview inmates, but were unable to select particular inmates, and 
prisoner himself could not initiate interview). 
 40 See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013) (“[T]here is no constitutional right 
to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.”); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting 
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999) (stating the government could decide “not to give out 
[police department] arrestee information at all”). 
 41 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that First Amendment provides a right 
of access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 
501 (1984) (finding right of access to jury voir dire); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 
457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (recognizing right of access to criminal trials); Richmond Newspapers, 
448 U.S. at 580 (same). 
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A.     Constitutional Framework 
Ever since the Supreme Court first invoked the Constitution’s 
protections to invalidate a government restriction on speech in 1931,42 
scholars have debated whether the First Amendment, in addition to 
prohibiting direct government censorship, also includes a right to 
acquire information. Beginning in the 1960s, the Court heard a series of 
cases that tested whether such a right exists, but “the Court responded 
in a remarkably erratic and fragmented way.”43 
1.     A Right to Information Generally 
One of the first access to information cases to reach the Supreme 
Court, Zemel v. Rusk, involved a challenge to the U.S. government’s 
travel ban to Cuba.44 While this might seem like an odd case for testing 
whether the First Amendment provides a right to gather information, 
the plaintiff explicitly couched his claim in terms of the First 
Amendment, asserting that the travel ban interfered with “the First 
Amendment rights of citizens to travel abroad so that they might 
acquaint themselves at first hand with the effects abroad of our 
Government’s policies, foreign and domestic, and with conditions 
abroad which might affect such policies.”45 Although the Court agreed 
that the travel restrictions “render[ed] less than wholly free the flow of 
information concerning [Cuba],”46 the Court stated that the 
government’s prohibition on travel did not implicate the First 
Amendment because it was merely “an inhibition of action.”47 
According to the Court, even though the government’s travel restriction 
“diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather information,” this does 
not raise First Amendment concerns: “The right to speak and publish 
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”48 
Less than a decade later, the Court appeared to retreat from this 
hardline position in Branzburg v. Hayes.49 Branzburg involved the 
 
 42 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 703, 706 (1931) (invalidating Minnesota 
law that provided for injunctions against those who created a “public nuisance” by publishing, 
selling, or distributing a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper”). 
 43 Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a 
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 251 (2004). 
 44 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 45 Id. at 16. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 17. 
 49 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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consolidation of four cases brought by journalists who claimed that the 
First Amendment protected them from having to identify their 
confidential sources before a grand jury. The journalists argued that 
compelling them to testify would unduly burden their right to gather 
news by deterring their sources from providing information “to the 
detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First 
Amendment.”50 In a 5-4 decision, the Court declined to recognize a 
privilege for journalists in the context of grand jury investigations, 
noting that even those who gather the news must comply with civil and 
criminal statutes of general applicability.51 Citing Zemel, the Court went 
on to state that “[i]t has generally been held that the First Amendment 
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally.”52 
Yet the Branzburg Court seemed to evidence some ambivalence 
about the reach of its holding in Zemel. Utilizing language that has 
perplexed lawyers who represent the press for nearly half a century,53 
the Court stated: 
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly 
to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does 
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some 
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated.54 
The Court’s suggestion in Branzburg that there might be some 
limits on the government’s ability to restrict newsgathering activity, 
however, did not presage an immediate change in the Court’s approach 
 
 50 Id. at 680. 
 51 Id. at 682 (“[N]either the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision 
protects the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in 
confidence.”). 
 52 Id. at 684. 
 53 See, e.g., James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for 
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 716 (1975) (“Justice Stewart called the Powell opinion 
‘enigmatic.’ It is opaque at best. Since it is, however, the key to understanding Branzburg, an 
attempt must be made to penetrate it.” (footnote omitted)); Donna M. Murasky, The 
Journalist’s Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829, 842 (1974) (“In its 
Branzburg decision the Supreme Court, without adequate explanation or justification, departed 
from previously announced principles of constitutional adjudication.”); John E. Osborn, The 
Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence After a Decade of 
Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 61 (1985) (“[T]he case law in the aftermath of 
Branzburg has thus far failed to provide clear and consistent guidelines for editors and 
reporters forced to choose between disclosure or possible incarceration.”). 
 54 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. Returning to this idea at the end of its decision, the Court 
again remarked that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections, and 
grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly 
different issues for resolution under the First Amendment.” Id. at 707. 
ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2017  6:33 PM 
2017] C O U RT  T R AN S P AR E N C Y  847 
 
to the First Amendment. In fact, “[s]omewhat paradoxically,”55 the 
Court held shortly after Branzburg that when the information at issue is 
held by the government,56 no First Amendment rights are implicated.57 
2.     A Right to Information from the Government 
In Pell v. Procunier58 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,59 a 
newspaper publisher and several reporters challenged various prison 
regulations that restricted their ability to interview inmates who had not 
been specifically made available by the prisons. Invoking the First 
Amendment’s speech and press clauses, the petitioners asserted that 
“the press have a constitutional right to interview any inmate who is 
willing to speak with them, in the absence of an individualized 
determination that the particular interview might create a clear and 
present danger to prison security or to some other substantial interest 
served by the corrections system.”60 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for 5-
4 majorities in both cases, declined to recognize that the First 
Amendment provided the press with a right of access to the requested 
information.61 Although Stewart acknowledged that in Branzburg the 
Court had suggested that newsgathering was entitled to some First 
Amendment protection, he saw the issue in Pell and Saxbe as whether 
the press had a constitutional right of access that was greater than that 
afforded the general public.62 Without clarifying the extent of the 
public’s right of access, Justice Stewart rejected this superior access 
argument, stating that the Constitution did not “require [the] 
government to accord the press special access to information not shared 
by members of the public generally.”63 
Given Justice Stewart’s characterization of the issue in Pell and 
Saxbe as involving special press access, the Court’s decisions in those 
cases arguably left open the possibility that the First Amendment might 
be implicated if the government refused to provide any public access to 
 
 55 McDonald, supra note 43, at 251. 
 56 Both Zemel and Branzburg dealt with claims that the government was unduly interfering 
with access to information that was outside of the government’s direct control. 
 57 See discussion infra Section I.A.2. 
 58 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to state prison regulation under 
which media representatives were able to interview inmates, but were unable to select particular 
inmates, and prisoner himself could not initiate interview). 
 59 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to federal prison regulation 
prohibiting face-to-face interviews by the press). 
 60 Pell, 417 U.S. at 829. 
 61 See id. at 833; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. 
 62 Pell, 417 U.S. at 833–34; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849–50. 
 63 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. 
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the prisons.64 In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., however, a fractured court 
seemed to snuff out any glimmer of a First Amendment right of access 
to information under such circumstances.65 In Houchins, a broadcasting 
company and members of the NAACP sued a sheriff who refused to 
provide access to a portion of a county jail that had been the site of a 
recent suicide by an inmate, as well as the subject of allegations 
regarding deplorable prison conditions.66 Emphasizing the public 
interest at stake, the plaintiffs argued that the sheriff “had violated the 
First Amendment by refusing to permit media access and failing to 
provide any effective means by which the public could be informed of 
conditions prevailing in the [prison] facility or learn of the prisoners’ 
grievances.”67 They further asserted that “[p]ublic access to such 
information was essential . . . in order for NAACP members to 
participate in the public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County.”68 
In a 4-3 decision that failed to produce a majority opinion,69 the 
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. Writing for a 
plurality of three justices, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that “[t]his 
Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of 
access to all sources of information within government control.”70 
 
 64 The Court concluded at the outset of its analysis in Pell that the government was not 
attempting to conceal prison conditions or to frustrate the press’ investigation and reporting of 
those conditions because “both the press and the general public [were] accorded full 
opportunities to observe prison conditions.” Pell, 417 U.S. at 830. The Court made similar 
observations in Saxbe:  
The policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons regarding visitations to prison inmates 
do not differ significantly from the California policies considered in Pell v. 
Procunier . . . . Indeed, journalists are given access to the prisons and to prison 
inmates that in significant respects exceeds that afforded to members of the general 
public. 
417 U.S. at 846–47. 
 65 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding no constitutional violation by county jail 
that refused to allow the press to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and 
photographs). 
 66 Id. at 3–6. 
 67 Id. at 4. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in the case. 
 70 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, but declined to join 
the plurality opinion. Id. at 16–19 (Stewart, J., concurring). Nevertheless, he agreed with the 
plurality that: 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access 
to information generated or controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the 
press any basic right of access superior to that of the public generally. The 
Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal access once 
government has opened its doors. 
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Characterizing the language in Branzburg as dictum, Burger asserted 
that the decision in Branzburg  
in no sense implied a constitutional right of access to news 
sources. . . . There is an undoubted right to gather news “from any 
source by means within the law,” but that affords no basis for the 
claim that the First Amendment compels others—private persons or 
governments—to supply information.71  
Burger then went on to note that “[w]hether the government should 
open penal institutions in the manner sought by respondents is a 
question of policy which a legislative body might appropriately resolve 
one way or the other.”72 
The Court applied similar reasoning in Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc.,73 where it held that the press had no First 
Amendment right to obtain physical copies of tape recordings made by 
President Nixon that the media had heard when they were played in 
open court.74 Citing, inter alia, Pell, Saxbe, and Zemel, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he First Amendment generally grants the press no 
right to information about a trial superior to that of the general 
public.”75 Because the tapes had already been played in open court, the 
Court concluded that no further public or press access was necessary.76 
Although Nixon, like Pell and Saxbe before it, appeared to leave 
open the possibility that the First Amendment might be implicated if 
the government refused to provide any public access to the White 
House tape recordings, the Court rejected such a right in Los Angeles 
Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.77 In United 
Reporting, a commercial data broker challenged a California statute that 
imposed restrictions on the use of arrestee addresses collected by the 
Los Angeles Police Department.78 In dismissing the publisher’s First 
Amendment claim, the Court remarked that “what we have before us is 
 
Id. at 16. Stewart explained in a footnote that “[f]orces and factors other than the Constitution 
must determine what government-held data are to be made available to the public.” Id. at 16 
n.*. 
 71 Id. at 10–11 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). 
 72 Id. at 12. 
 73 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
 74 Id. at 609. Twenty-two hours of taped conversations were played at the trial and admitted 
into evidence. Id. at 594. 
 75 Id. at 609. 
 76 Id. at 610. The respondents also argued that release of the tapes was required by the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of a public trial. Id. According to the Court, any right of public access 
under the Sixth Amendment had been satisfied: “The requirement of a public trial is satisfied 
by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what 
they have observed. That opportunity abundantly existed here.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 77 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999). 
 78 Id. at 34–36. 
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nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information in its 
possession.”79 Removing any doubt that the First Amendment might 
encompass the right to demand this information from the government, 
the Court went on to opine that “California could decide not to give out 
arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment.”80 
The Court’s most recent pronouncement on the question of public 
access to government information occurred in 2013 in McBurney v. 
Young,81 and left little reason to think the Court is willing to revisit its 
rejection of a general First Amendment right of access to government 
information. Although McBurney involved a challenge under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and dormant Commerce Clause to 
Virginia’s requirement that only citizens of Virginia are allowed to 
request information under the state’s Freedom of Information Act, the 
Court rejected the idea that there is a general constitutional right to 
obtain information from the government under the First Amendment. 
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court wrote: 
[W]e reject petitioners’ sweeping claim that the challenged provision 
of the Virginia FOIA violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
because it denies them the right to access public information on 
equal terms with citizens of the Commonwealth. We cannot agree 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause covers this broad right. 
This Court has repeatedly made clear that there is no constitutional 
right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.82 
If we were to end our analysis here, we would conclude that the 
question of whether the First Amendment encompasses a right to 
acquire information from the government has been answered in the 
negative. But in a parallel line of cases, the Court has carved out one 
area of government activity that the public is entitled to access under the 
First Amendment: criminal trials and criminal trial-like proceedings. 
 
 79 Id. at 40. 
 80 Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and was joined by six other Justices, all of whom 
wrote or joined concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, 
and Breyer, concluded that the fact that the statute at issue was “properly analyzed as a 
restriction on access to government information, not as a restriction on protected speech,” was 
sufficient grounds in and of itself for rejecting the publisher’s First Amendment claim. Id. at 42 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). In their view, “California could, as the Court notes, constitutionally 
decide not to give out arrestee address information at all.” Id. at 43. 
 81 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013). 
 82 Id. at 1718 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14). 
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3.     A Right to Information from the Courts 
As an initial matter, it would appear that the Sixth Amendment, 
which states that the accused in all criminal prosecutions has “the right 
to a speedy and public trial,”83 provides a right of public access to the 
courts. But the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court held in Gannett 
Co. v. DePasquale,84 merely grants a criminal defendant the right to a 
public trial, it does not give members of the public a right to attend the 
proceedings.85 “The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access 
to a criminal trial on the part of the public,” the Court observed in 
Gannett.86 “Its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the 
accused.”87 
Although the Court refused to allow the press or public to object to 
the closure of criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment, 
Gannett marked an important shift in the Court’s approach to a First 
Amendment right of access. Unlike in the prison access cases, where the 
media plaintiffs had argued that they have a First Amendment right of 
access to government information beyond that provided to the public, 
Gannett involved a claim that the closure of a pre-trial suppression 
hearing in a murder case violated the public’s right of access under the 
First and Sixth Amendments.88 Even though the Gannett decision came 
down only a year after Houchins, the Court appeared to be more 
receptive to a right of public access to the courts, at least in the context 
of criminal proceedings. Instead of rejecting the Gannett Company’s 
First Amendment claim outright, Justice Stewart, who had concurred in 
the judgment in Houchins,89 expressly declined to address the question 
 
 83 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 84 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
 85 Id. at 383–86, 391. As a leading media law casebook reports, the Court’s decision in 
Gannett was widely criticized by the media: 
The aftermath of Gannett was extraordinary. The decision came under severe media 
criticism. In August 1979, the American Newspaper Publishers Association reported 
that “[j]udges all over the United States have closed or upheld the closing of more 
than 21 courtrooms in the five weeks since the U.S. Supreme Court’s July 2 decision 
in Gannett.” Shortly thereafter, a number of the Justices began speaking out in public 
about the Gannett decision. In August 1979, for example, Chief Justice Burger 
commented to a reporter that judges who were closing trials might be misreading 
Gannett. In an article in Editor and Publisher, Justice Brennan suggested that Gannett 
involved only the Sixth Amendment, not the First, and Justice Stevens published an 
article in Bar Leader magazine discussing the case. 
DAVID KOHLER ET AL., MEDIA AND THE LAW 948 (2d ed. 2014). 
 86 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379. 
 87 Id. at 379–80. 
 88 Id. at 370–71, 391. 
 89 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
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of whether the closure of the pre-trial proceeding violated the First 
Amendment: “[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations, a question 
we do not decide, this putative right was given all appropriate deference 
by the state nisi prius court in the present case.”90 
For the first time since the Court’s vague admonition in Branzburg 
that there must be “some protection” under the First Amendment for 
newsgathering,91 Justice Stewart’s opinion in Gannett explicitly 
acknowledged the possibility that the public might have a right of access 
to judicial proceedings under the First Amendment.92 In a series of cases 
that came to the Court over the following decade, the Court tackled this 
question head on, concluding that the First Amendment’s press and 
speech clause guarantees do necessitate a public right to attend criminal 
trials and other types of criminal proceedings.93 
The first of these cases, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
involved the exclusion of the press and public from a murder trial in 
Virginia state court.94 In a 7-1 decision95 that produced four separate 
opinions, the Court held that the public has a First Amendment right of 
access to criminal trials.96 Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the plurality 
opinion, began by scrutinizing the history of the American and English 
criminal justice systems and concluded that “the historical evidence 
demonstrates conclusively that . . . criminal trials both here and in 
England had long been presumptively open” to the public.97 This 
openness, Burger observed, provided “significant community 
therapeutic value,”98 “gave assurance that the proceedings were 
conducted fairly to all concerned, and . . . discouraged perjury, the 
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or 
partiality.”99 
Although Burger conceded in Richmond Newspapers that the First 
Amendment does not explicitly require public access to criminal trials, 
he concluded that the Amendment’s provisions implied that such a right 
exists: “In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the 
 
 90 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 392. 
 91 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). 
 92 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 94 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555. 
 95 Justice Powell did not participate in the case. 
 96 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–76. 
 97 Id. at 569. 
 98 Id. at 570. 
 99 Id. at 569; see also id. at 571 (noting that public scrutiny of criminal trials fostered 
“acceptance of both the process and its results”). 
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First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to 
attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees.”100 In 
doing so, Burger’s plurality decision in Richmond Newspapers diverged 
sharply from the Court’s parallel line of cases rejecting a First 
Amendment right of access to information controlled by the 
government.101 At least in the context of criminal trials, Richmond 
Newspapers foreshadowed a far broader understanding of the First 
Amendment that protects not just the right to speak, but also the right 
to acquire information. The First Amendment, Burger wrote, “goes 
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to 
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which 
members of the public may draw.”102 
Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, a 
majority of the Court adopted this view of the First Amendment when it 
invalidated a Massachusetts statute that required trial judges, at trials for 
specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of eighteen, to 
exclude the public from the courtroom during the testimony of the 
victim.103 In striking down the statute, Justice William Brennan’s 
majority opinion affirmed that the First Amendment is “broad enough 
to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in 
the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the 
enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.”104 Underlying the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, Brennan noted, “is the 
common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that Amendment was 
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.’”105 Echoing 
Burger’s plurality decision in Richmond Newspapers, Brennan remarked 
that a right of public access helps to ensure that the “constitutionally 
protected ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ is an informed one.”106 
The Court’s decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe 
Newspaper left unresolved the question of how far a First Amendment 
right of access to the courts extends. Both cases involved access to 
criminal trials, which have historically been open to the public. Yet the 
question of public access also arises in other types of court proceedings. 
The first case to arrive at the Court testing the reach of the First 
 
 100 Id. at 575. 
 101 See discussion supra Section I.A.2. 
 102 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–76 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (noting in 
dictum that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated”). 
 103 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 104 Id. at 604 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579–80). 
 105 Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
 106 Id. at 605. 
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Amendment’s right of public access to the courts involved criminal voir 
dire proceedings and was followed shortly thereafter by a second case 
arising from a preliminary hearing. 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I),107 a 
trial judge closed nearly all of the voir dire proceedings in a case 
involving the rape and murder of a teenage girl based on the stated 
belief that if the press were present in the courtroom, jurors “would lack 
the candor necessary to assure a fair trial.”108 In a unanimous decision, 
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right of access 
extends to criminal voir dire proceedings. The Court first noted that 
public jury selection was the “common practice in America when the 
Constitution was adopted,” and emphasized that openness “enhances 
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of 
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.”109 
Two years later, in the identically named Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),110 the Supreme Court faced the 
question of whether a First Amendment right of access applies to 
preliminary hearings.111 In that case, a magistrate judge excluded the 
public, pursuant to a California statute, from a forty-one day 
preliminary hearing in a high-profile murder prosecution in order to 
protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.112 At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the judge refused to release the transcript of the hearing and 
sealed the record.113 
Pulling the various strands together from Richmond Newspapers, 
Globe Newspaper, and Press-Enterprise I, Chief Justice Burger set out to 
clarify the test for determining whether a First Amendment right of 
access applies to a specific judicial proceeding. Explicating what is now 
known as the “tests of experience and logic,”114 Burger wrote: “our 
decisions have emphasized two complementary considerations.”115 First, 
a court is to consider “whether the place and process have historically 
 
 107 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
 108 Id. at 503–04. The voir dire took six weeks, and all but approximately three days was 
closed to the public. Id. at 503. Citing the jurors’ right to privacy, the judge also refused to 
release the transcript of the proceedings even after the trial began and continued to keep the 
transcript under seal post-conviction. Id. at 503–04. 
 109 Id. at 508 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569–71). 
 110 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 111 Id. at 3. 
 112 Id. at 3–4. 
 113 Id. at 4–5. 
 114 See, e.g., El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993) (referring to 
the “tests of experience and logic” enunciated in Press-Enterprise II). 
 115 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
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been open to the press and general public” (the “experience” prong).116 
Second, the court must assess “whether public access plays a significant 
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question” 
(the “logic” prong).117 If both prongs are met, a First Amendment right 
of access attaches to the proceeding in question, which can be denied 
only if the government’s justification for closure withstands strict 
scrutiny. As Burger observed: “These considerations of experience and 
logic are, of course, related, for history and experience shape the 
functioning of governmental processes. If the particular proceeding in 
question passes these tests of experience and logic, a qualified First 
Amendment right of public access attaches.”118 
Examining California’s and other states’ practices with regard to 
preliminary hearings, Burger concluded that such hearings have 
historically been open to the public and thus the “experience” prong was 
satisfied.119 Turning to the “logic” prong, he determined that in 
California preliminary hearings are “sufficiently like a trial to justify 
the . . . conclusion” that public access “is essential to the proper 
functioning of the criminal justice system.”120 Burger rejected the 
argument that public access to a preliminary hearing is unnecessary 
because the hearing cannot result in the conviction of the accused and it 
is held before a magistrate without a jury, noting that “these features, 
standing alone, do not make public access any less essential to the 
proper functioning of the proceedings in the overall criminal justice 
process.”121 To the contrary, the absence of a jury, Burger observed, 
“makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even 
more significant.”122 Finding both prongs satisfied, the Court held that a 
qualified First Amendment right of access attached to the preliminary 
hearing.123 
Since Press-Enterprise I and II, the Supreme Court has not revisited 
its conclusion that the First Amendment provides a qualified right of 
access to criminal trials and trial-like proceedings, nor has the Court 
 
 116 Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) and 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
judgment)). 
 117 Id. (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606). 
 118 Id. at 9. 
 119 Id. at 10–11. 
 120 Id. at 11–12. The Court noted that in California a defendant “has an absolute right to an 
elaborate preliminary hearing before a neutral magistrate. . . . [and] has the right to personally 
appear at the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to 
present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence.” Id. at 12 (citation 
omitted). 
 121 Id. at 12. 
 122 Id. at 13. 
 123 Id. 
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had occasion to resolve whether the experience and logic test mandates 
a right of access to other judicial activities, including civil proceedings 
and court records. In El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico,124 the 
Court did clarify one possible ambiguity in the application of the 
“experience” prong of the Press-Enterprise II standard, instructing that 
when assessing the historical record for a “tradition of open[ness],”125 a 
court “does not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, 
but instead ‘to the experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout 
the United States.’”126 
In summary, the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing a putative 
First Amendment right of access to information paint a conflicting 
doctrinal picture. In Zemel, the Court held that governmental 
restrictions on information-gathering activities do not implicate the 
First Amendment.127 In Branzburg, however, the Court suggested that 
newsgathering activities are entitled to at least some First Amendment 
protection, although the Court did not clarify the extent of this 
protection.128 In the prison access cases (Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins) and 
government records cases (Nixon, United Reporting, and McBurney) the 
Court seemed to reverse course again by holding that any First 
Amendment protection for gathering information did not extend to 
information held by the government.129 
Against this backdrop, Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, 
and Press-Enterprise I & II stand out as outliers in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning a First Amendment right of access to 
information. In order to make sense of these decisions, we must ask 
what it is about criminal trials and the information they generate that 
distinguish them from other governmental activities that are not subject 
to a First Amendment right of access. To answer this question, it will be 
helpful first to examine how the lower courts are applying the 
experience and logic test. 
B.     Application in the Lower Courts 
Lower courts have struggled to make sense of the Supreme Court’s 
conflicting guidance on whether a First Amendment right of access to 
government information exists. This Section summarizes the most 
 
 124 508 U.S. 147 (1993). 
 125 Id. at 150. 
 126 Id. (quoting Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 127 See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 128 See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text. 
 129 See supra notes 58–82 and accompanying text. 
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important trends in these decisions and highlights patterns in how 
judges resolve disputes over public access to the courts. 
As a starting point, it is clear that lower courts treat the three 
branches of government dissimilarly when it comes to claims that the 
First Amendment provides a right of public access. Most courts, for 
example, refuse to recognize a First Amendment right of access to the 
activities of the executive and legislative branches, relying on either the 
outright rejection of such a right in Houchins and United Reporting,130 
or by finding that the government activity at issue does not pass the 
experience and logic test from Press-Enterprise II.131 Although there may 
be good reason to question the refusal to recognize a First Amendment 
right of access to government information in some of these contexts,132 
those arguments can be left to another day because the focus here is on a 
right of public access to court proceedings and records. 
With regard to the activities of the judicial branch, lower courts 
frequently do find a First Amendment right of access.133 Nevertheless, 
due to the Supreme Court’s opaque guidance on when and why such a 
right exists, courts vary substantially with regard to how they evaluate 
First Amendment access claims. The chaotic state of the law on public 
access is particularly evident in cases involving access to civil 
proceedings and in disputes over the sealing of court records,134 but 
inconsistency pervades the entire body of court access law. Indeed, 
scholars have described the lower courts’ application of the Supreme 
Court’s access precedents as “convoluted,”135 “confus[ed],”136 and 
 
 130 See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (rejecting First Amendment right of access to names of detainees); Amelkin v. McClure, 
205 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2000) (no First Amendment right of access to state accident 
reports); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1171–73 (3d Cir. 1986) (no First 
Amendment right of access to state environmental agency’s records pertaining to water 
contamination); United States v. Loughner, 807 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834–35 (D. Ariz. 2011) (no 
First Amendment right of access to law enforcement investigation materials); Copley Press, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288, 309–10 (Cal. 2006) (no First Amendment right of access to 
records of county Civil Service Commission). 
 131 See, e.g., Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize First 
Amendment right of access to Internal Revenue Service documents pertaining to tax 
investigation of Al Capone); Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1323–25 (W.D. 
Okla. 2014) (no First Amendment right of access to executions); Sorenson v. Superior Court, 
161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 794, 809–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (no First Amendment right of access to 
involuntary commitment proceedings); Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 776–77 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2001) (no First Amendment right of access to state legislative meetings). 
 132 See McDonald, supra note 43, at 340–46 (arguing for a general First Amendment right of 
access to government information). 
 133 The unique role of the courts within the American constitutional system is discussed in 
Section II.B.4. 
 134 See infra notes 425–33 and accompanying text. 
 135 Olson, supra note 27, at 473. 
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“wildly inconsistent.”137 One judge even compared the increasing 
secrecy in the courts to “kudzu,” a nearly uncontrollable creeping vine 
that “blocks access to sunlight, slowly strangling fields and forests in its 
wake.”138 
1.     Inconsistency and Uncertainty 
Following the approach outlined in Press-Enterprise II, most courts 
apply, or at least purport to apply, the Supreme Court’s “experience and 
logic” test to determine whether a First Amendment right of access 
applies to a particular judicial proceeding or record. When we examine 
these cases closely, however, we see that the courts are not uniform in 
their application of this test. Instead, judges often disagree about the 
relative importance of the test’s two prongs and about whether 
particular types of court proceedings and records satisfy one or both of 
the prongs. Some courts, for example, rely exclusively on the experience 
prong,139 while others find a First Amendment right of access if the logic 
prong is met.140 Still other courts hold that a right of access attaches only 
if both prongs are satisfied.141 
Courts also appear uncertain whether the experience and logic test 
is applicable in situations that do not closely resemble the settings in 
which the test arose. Although most courts recognize a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal and civil trials,142 as well as to 
 
 136 Lewis F. Weakland, Note, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett and 
Richmond Newspapers Public Right of Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 625 (1986). 
 137 Levine, supra note 27, at 1758.  
 138 Smith, supra note 26, at 180–81. 
 139 See infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
 140 See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 155–60 and accompanying text. 
 142 Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, 
nearly all courts have held that the First Amendment requires a presumption of public access to 
criminal trials. See LEE LEVINE ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 3.01[3] (4th ed. 2011). 
Most courts also recognize a First Amendment right of public access to civil trials. See, e.g., 
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); Westmoreland v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 
F.2d 1059, 1067–70 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 
1178 (6th Cir. 1983); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 
(Cal. 1999); Barron v. Fl. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 117–18 (Fl. 1988); Rapid 
City Journal v. Delaney, 2011 SD 55, ¶ 17, 804 N.W.2d 388, 395; see also In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. 
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he policy reasons for granting public access to 
criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well.”); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding right of access applies to civil trials pertaining to release or 
incarceration of prisoners); Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 498 (D. 
Del. 2012) (noting that “every Court of Appeals to consider the issue . . . has held that there is a 
right of access to civil trials” and citing cases from Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013). But see Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. 
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many criminal trial-like proceedings,143 judicial activities that do not fit 
these precise molds are treated with far more variability. Indecision 
about the scope of a First Amendment right of access is most acute in 
cases involving public access to pre-trial civil proceedings, court 
records, and administrative hearings, but even in the criminal context 
some courts are reluctant to venture very far from the trial-like 
proceedings at issue in the Press-Enterprise cases.144 Given the three 
decades that courts have had to work out these issues since the Supreme 
Court’s Press-Enterprise decisions, it is notable that so much uncertainty 
still remains about the scope of this important First Amendment right. 
For many courts, whether there has been a history of public access 
to a particular court proceeding is determinative of whether a First 
Amendment right of access exists. For example, in situations where 
public access has not been a tradition in American law—such as grand 
jury145 and settlement146 proceedings—most courts refuse to recognize a 
right of access under the First Amendment regardless of whether public 
access could play a positive role in the functioning of the proceeding in 
question. Showing how strong the allure of history can be, even courts 
that do not rely exclusively on the experience prong often place 
significant weight on whether the proceeding or court record has 
historically been open to the public. When a proceeding does not have a 
long history of access, courts have sought to draw analogies with 
 
Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[N]either this Court nor 
the Supreme Court has ever indicated that it would apply the Richmond Newspapers test to 
anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.”). 
 143 See LEVINE ET AL., supra note 142, §§ 3.01–3.02. In the criminal context, courts have 
extended a First Amendment right of access to “preliminary hearings, suppression hearings, 
bail and detention hearings, competency hearings, and plea hearings.” Id. § 3.01[1] (“Today, 
almost all pretrial [criminal] proceedings are presumptively open.”). Even though the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and many state court rules call for open civil trials, see id. § 3.02, we 
see far more variability in the application of a First Amendment right to pre-trial civil 
proceedings. See id. § 3.02[2]–[5]. 
 144 See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 921 N.E.2d 333, 358–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding no First 
Amendment right of access to criminal pre-trial hearings on jury questionnaires or the State’s 
other crimes evidence); Eagle-Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Clerk-Magistrate, 863 N.E.2d 517, 524–26 
(Mass. 2007) (finding no First Amendment right of access to show cause hearings because they 
“bear[] little resemblance to a trial”); Tacoma News, Inc. v. Cayce, 256 P.3d 1179, 1187, 1191 
(Wash. 2011) (rejecting right of access to transcript and videotape of prisoner’s deposition in 
criminal case taken in closed courtroom with judge present because it resembled “mere 
discovery”). 
 145 See, e.g., United States v. Index Newspapers L.L.C., 766 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014); 
In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 410 & n.4 
(2d Cir. 2009); In re Donovan, 801 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
 146 See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903–04 (6th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. 129, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d sub nom. 
United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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proceedings that do have an established history of openness147 or have 
relied on the history, however short, of the specific proceeding 
involved.148 
Other courts discount the importance of history in favor of 
examining the logic of public access, focusing on whether public access 
“plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question.”149 In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court itself 
noted that several courts had held that a right of access attaches to pre-
trial proceedings even when those proceedings had “no historical 
counterpart.”150 Since Press-Enterprise II, courts have continued to find 
a right of access in circumstances where no extensive history of access 
can be demonstrated if the logic of openness supports a right of 
access.151 In Seattle Times Co. v. United States District Court,152 for 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that public access to pre-trial detention hearings should not be 
foreclosed simply because these proceedings do not have an “unbroken 
history of public access.”153 Reasoning that because pre-trial detention 
hearings deal with issues that “are often important to a full 
understanding of the way in which the judicial process and the 
 
 147 See, e.g., United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1358 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he detention and 
delinquency proceedings called for in the Act are closely analogous to criminal 
proceedings . . . .”); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D. Utah 
1985) (analogizing administrative fact-finding proceedings to civil trials, which enjoyed long 
history of openness), appeal dismissed and judgment below vacated and remanded as moot, 832 
F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987); Freitas v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 92 P.3d 993 (Haw. 2004) 
(comparing Administrative Driver’s License Revocation Office proceedings to deportation 
proceedings and Civil Service Commission hearings). 
 148 See, e.g., Index Newspapers, L.L.C., 766 F.3d at 1094–95 (holding that a right of access 
attached to transcripts of confinement status hearings despite lack of evidence supporting a 
history of openness); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 837–40 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
a right of access attached to post-trial inquiries into jury misconduct even though the practice 
had only had a fourteen-year recorded history); First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & 
Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 469 n.1, 472 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that public access must be 
guided by “unique history and function” of fourteen-year-old Judicial Review Board). 
 149 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 150 Id. at 10 n.3. 
 151 See, e.g., Simone, 14 F.3d at 840 (recognizing right of access to post-trial hearing in 
criminal case even though “experience provides little guidance”); United States v. Suarez, 880 
F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding right of access to fee request forms from court-appointed 
counsel despite the lack of a “tradition” of openness under a recent statute requiring such 
applications); Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1516–17 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(discounting the historical aspect of the Press-Enterprise II test and holding that a right of 
access attaches to pre-trial detention hearings); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 722 
(D. Mass. 1987) (“While the history of post-verdict interviews appears scant, the broad latitude 
afforded the press in gathering news, especially in recent years, tends to favor accessability [sic] 
in this areas as well.”). 
 152 845 F.2d 1513. 
 153 Id. at 1516 (“This history and the prevalent use of informal procedures should not 
automatically foreclose a right of access.”). 
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government as a whole are functioning,” the court concluded that the 
same societal interests that mandated a First Amendment right of access 
in Globe Newspaper apply to pre-trial detention hearings.154 
A majority of courts, however, do treat the experience and logic 
test as a two-part test and require that both prongs be established before 
a First Amendment right of access attaches to a particular court 
proceeding or record.155 But this does not mean that these courts agree 
as to what is required to satisfy the individual prongs. In fact, it is not 
unusual to see different courts come to opposite conclusions when they 
apply the experience and logic test to the same or similar proceedings. 
Application of the test has thus led to inconsistent results in a wide 
variety of cases, including civil commitment proceedings,156 deportation 
proceedings,157 guardianship proceedings,158 judicial misconduct 
hearings,159 and juvenile proceedings.160 We also see a great deal of 
variability in the approaches that courts take with regard to court 
records.161 As a consequence, there is considerable variance from state 
to state—and sometimes even from judge to judge—with regard to 
whether many types of court proceedings and records are open to public 
scrutiny. 
2.     The Limits of Experience and Logic 
The problems with the experience and logic test, however, run 
much deeper than the idiosyncratic assessments of the history and logic 
 
 154 Id. at 1516–17. 
 155 See Levine, supra note 27, at 1778 n.242 (citing cases). 
 156 See LEVINE ET AL., supra note 142, § 3.03 (citing cases). 
 157 Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a First 
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings and associated records), with N. Jersey 
Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding no First Amendment right of 
access to deportation proceedings or records and explicitly disagreeing with Detroit Free Press). 
 158 Compare N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1990) (finding a 
First Amendment right of access to guardianship hearings), with Mayer v. State, 523 So. 2d 
1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding no First Amendment right of access to 
guardianship/custody hearings). 
 159 Compare Bradbury v. Idaho Judiciary Council, 28 P.3d 1006 (Idaho 2001) (finding no 
First Amendment right of access to Judiciary Council proceedings), with Griffen v. Ark. 
Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 816 (Ark. 2007) (finding formal probable-
cause meeting of the Judicial Discipline Commission should have been open to the public 
where the judge waived confidentiality and judicial discipline may be imposed, but avoiding the 
First Amendment question). 
 160 Compare In re Application for News Media Coverage in the Matter of M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d 
207, 209 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (finding First Amendment right of access to delinquency proceeding), 
with In re J. S., 438 A.2d 1125 (Vt. 1981) (affirming mandatory closure of all juvenile court 
proceedings). 
 161 See infra notes 240–43 and accompanying text. 
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of openness in particular court proceedings. The real problem is that the 
experience and logic prongs focus on the wrong things when evaluating 
whether public access should be required under the First Amendment. 
By ignoring the role that court transparency plays in our constitutional 
structure, the test turns out to be both too broad and too narrow a gauge 
for determining whether a right of public access exists. 
a.     Experience Is a Poor Guide for a Constitutional Right of 
Access 
There are several reasons that experience is a poor guide for a 
constitutional right of access. First, uncertainty inevitably arises 
concerning how long public access must continue for there to be a 
“tradition of accessibility.” Second, and more fundamentally, it is not at 
all clear why the past provision of public access should be determinative 
of the First Amendment’s contemporary reach. 
As the preceding Section noted, the lower courts have struggled to 
come up with a consistent yardstick for evaluating whether public access 
has been sufficiently longstanding to satisfy the Court’s requirement of a 
tradition of accessibility.162 This has generated confusion and frustration 
for both judges and access advocates. As the prominent First 
Amendment lawyer Lee Levine has lamented, the Court’s experience 
prong has left lawyers who represent the media wondering: “How long 
must public access exist for there to be a tradition of openness? How 
widespread must a tradition of public access to a particular proceeding 
be before openness is blessed by the judgment of experience?”163 
Part of the problem is due to the contrasting traditions of public 
access in different courts and in various parts of the country. Although 
the Supreme Court has clarified that a court should consider the history 
of access “throughout the United States” when assessing the experience 
prong,164 the fact remains that public access has varied historically from 
state to state. While past experience may provide a useful guidepost in 
some situations, the lack of a tradition of openness should not be 
determinative of whether a First Amendment right of access attaches to 
a particular proceeding or record. 
The idea that history should inform the analysis of when a First 
Amendment right of access exists originated in Chief Justice Burger’s 
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, in which he concluded that 
the First Amendment “prohibit[s] government from summarily closing 
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time 
 
 162 See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
 163 LEVINE ET AL., supra note 142, § 2.02[8]. 
 164 El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993). 
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that Amendment was adopted.”165 This use of tradition is 
understandable. If, as Burger wrote, the First Amendment is intended to 
“prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from 
which members of the public may draw,”166 then it makes sense to say 
that it prevents the government from closing court proceedings that 
have long been open to the public. 
It does not follow, however, that the converse should be true: that 
the absence of historical access forecloses a First Amendment right of 
access. Under such an approach, courts can inoculate themselves from a 
First Amendment right of access by consistently refusing to open their 
proceedings to the public. Although tradition can be a useful 
consideration in assessing the legitimacy of the government’s interests 
in closure, its value is limited when determining whether a First 
Amendment right of access exists in the first place.167 As Heidi Kitrosser 
notes, evaluating “access claims against the framers’ presumed views 
regarding the openness of particular proceedings finds little support in 
the text, history, or theory of the First Amendment.”168 Justice Brennan, 
who concurred in Richmond Newspapers and wrote for the Court in 
Globe Newspaper, took pains to tie the Court’s consideration of history 
to broader concerns, noting that a past history of access is “significant in 
constitutional terms not only ‘because the Constitution carries the gloss 
of history,’ but also because ‘a tradition of accessibility implies the 
favorable judgment of experience.’”169 
The history of public access to a particular proceeding or record 
should be relevant, if at all, because it informs the analysis of whether 
public access advances constitutional values. In other words, history can 
aid a court’s consideration of the benefits of access, but it does not 
substitute for it. Just because a court proceeding has been open in the 
past does not mean that that the First Amendment should require that it 
remain open; similarly, a lack of historical access should not preclude 
the recognition of a right of access in the future. As Judge Kimba Wood 
has observed: 
 
 165 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980). 
 166 Id. at 576 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 167 The Supreme Court’s inconsistent use of history in interpreting the scope of First 
Amendment rights has been criticized in other contexts as well. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The 
Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2016) (“If the Court consistently relied on 
history, it would be forced to roll back protections it has extended for all sorts of speech that 
were traditionally unprotected (or at least not clearly protected), and perhaps extend 
protections to speech that the Court has excluded, such as obscenity.”). 
 168 Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 114. 
 169 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) (quoting Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
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[I]f the reasons why things were the way they were then have largely 
disappeared, or if new aspects of an old proceeding have changed 
that proceeding’s nature, then we do not really have the judgment of 
experience—because that which experience judged no longer exists. 
In other words, things developed the way they did for particular 
reasons, and took into account the circumstances that existed and the 
values that were important back then; unless we also examine 
whether our circumstances and our values should prompt us to 
maintain the tradition, we risk making the wrong decisions on access 
and of erring either on the side of openness or of closure.170 
When we make history determinative of future rights of access, we 
lock in a static set of practices that may have little to do with the First 
Amendment justification for public access in the first place. Indeed, it 
makes little sense to utilize a test that says that the public’s right of 
access to the courts is limited to what the public could observe in 1789 
or even 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The fact is, 
our judicial system is constantly evolving. Take criminal law as an 
example. Criminal cases are increasingly resolved without any pre-trial 
appearances by a defendant, let alone a full blown jury trial; today, most 
criminal cases go straight from indictment to plea, with no suppression 
hearing, no presentation of evidence, and no examination of 
witnesses.171 
b.     The Logic Prong Is Focused on the Wrong Things 
Although some judges and commentators have called for 
jettisoning the experience prong,172 it would be a pyrrhic victory for 
 
 170 Kimba M. Wood, Reexamining the Access Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1996). 
Oliver Wendell Holmes made a similar point when he famously wrote that “[i]t is revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). Holmes 
went on to remark that “[i]t is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Id. 
 171 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2466 n.9 (2004) (“In fiscal year 2000, of 69,283 criminal cases disposed of in federal 
district court by trial or plea (thus excluding dismissals), 64,939 (93.7%) were disposed of by 
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. In 2000, of approximately 924,700 felony convictions in state 
courts, about 879,200 (95%) were by guilty plea. Though it is impossible to be sure, most of 
these pleas probably resulted from plea bargains.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 172 See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Because the first 
amendment must be interpreted in the context of current values and conditions, the lack of an 
historic tradition of open bail reduction hearings does not bar our recognizing a right of access 
to such hearings.” (citations omitted)); Barber v. Shop-Rite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc., 923 
A.2d 286, 292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (concluding that the history prong “provides 
little guidance”); Olson, supra note 27, at 490 (arguing that “[h]istorical tradition alone cannot 
be dispositive”); Alice Cole Ortiz, Note, Our “Eternal Struggle Between Liberty and Security”: A 
First Amendment Right of Access to Deportation Hearings, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1203, 1234–37 
(2003) (proposing a replacement test that looks to whether a proceeding involves liberty or 
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clarity to rely solely on the logic prong—as it is currently understood—
to determine whether a First Amendment right of access exists. When 
we examine how courts apply the logic prong, we see two related 
problems that limit its efficacy as a threshold test for a right of access 
under the First Amendment. 
First, courts take too narrow a view of the benefits of openness, 
focusing only on the role that public access plays in a particular court 
proceeding and eschewing a broader structural perspective that 
considers how public access advances democratic self-government. 
While the Supreme Court alluded to the structural benefits of public 
access in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper,173 the test it laid 
out in Press-Enterprise II directs courts to assess the benefits of access to 
the functioning of the specific proceeding in question.174 As a result, the 
Court’s access cases have left the lower courts confused as to which 
values matter most when considering public access claims: the benefits 
that public access confers on a specific proceeding; the impact that 
public access has on the court system as a whole; or the structural role 
that access serves by exposing the public to information necessary for 
self-governance. Most courts focus on the first of these benefits with an 
occasional mention of the value of openness to the overall system of 
justice. Very few courts spend any time analyzing the third, and most 
important, benefit of public access: the role that court transparency 
plays in our constitutional system.175 
Second, because courts focus on the role that access plays in 
individual court proceedings, the logic prong ends up being too 
indeterminate to facilitate reasoned line drawing between proceedings 
where public access would advance First Amendment values and those 
in which secrecy is necessary to preserve other interests.176 Although an 
inquiry directed at assessing whether public access is important to the 
functioning of a specific court proceeding has intuitive appeal, such a 
narrow view of the logic of openness fails to provide useful guidance to 
courts when evaluating cases where there are significant competing 
interests opposing openness. For example, public access will almost 
certainly enhance the perception of fairness, discourage perjury, and 
reduce the influence of bias and partiality in nearly every court 
 
property interests and whether due process rights are required); see also Michelle Kundmueller, 
The Devil Is in All the Details (Not Just in Georgia), 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 221, 260–61 
(2014) (rejecting the use of history as a determinate of constitutional rights generally). 
 173 See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text. 
 174 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (commanding courts to assess “whether public 
access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question”). 
 175 See infra Section II.B. 
 176 See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 99, 115; Weakland, supra note 136, at 620–21. 
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proceeding.177 It is difficult to imagine a court proceeding in which 
public access would not further its functioning to some degree. Justice 
Stevens pointed this out in his dissent in Press-Enterprise II, arguing that 
the Court’s logic test could require that even grand jury proceedings be 
open to the public.178  
All of which is to say that although the experience and logic test 
ostensibly offers a way for courts to evaluate public access claims, in 
practice it leaves courts with little actual guidance in deciding difficult 
cases. 
3.     The Danger of Ad Hoc Balancing 
Because of uncertainty about how to apply the experience and logic 
test, many courts default to a form of ad hoc balancing, treating public 
access as simply one of many equally important competing 
considerations. Courts that engage in such balancing subvert the 
Supreme Court’s two-step approach to evaluating access claims. Under 
the framework laid out in Globe Newspaper and further refined in the 
Press-Enterprise cases, courts are first charged with determining whether 
a right of access exists under the First Amendment by examining 
whether there has a been a history of public access and whether public 
access would play a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
process in question.179 If this threshold test is met, a right of access 
attaches and the proceeding is presumptively open to the public unless 
closure is necessary to serve a compelling interest, and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.180 
Rather than apply this two-step inquiry, which makes the benefits 
of public access a primary consideration in whether a First Amendment 
right of access attaches to the proceeding in question, some courts 
simply evaluate all of the competing interests at once.181 In doing so, 
 
 177 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982) (identifying “at least six 
societal interests” advanced by public access and finding that these interests supported a First 
Amendment right of access to pre-trial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings). 
 178 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 25–26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens warned: “[T]here 
are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of 
decreased data flow.” Id. at 28 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
588 (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 179 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 180 The Supreme Court has used slightly different wording for evaluating the state’s interests 
supporting closure, but the test basically matches the Court’s strict scrutiny test as applied in 
other First Amendment contexts. See infra notes 436–41 and accompanying text. 
 181 See, e.g., Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
public has no right of access to a particular proceeding without first establishing that the 
benefits of opening the proceedings outweigh the costs to the public.”); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988) (balancing interest in closure against 
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they discount the benefits of access and overweigh the interests in 
closure. Whereas the Supreme Court’s two-step approach requires that 
the interests supporting closure be compelling, courts that engage in ad 
hoc balancing can avoid this high standard for closure if they conclude 
at the threshold that on balance public access does not play a significant 
positive role in the proceeding. For many courts, their analysis ends 
with just such a balancing of interests, which is increasingly becoming 
the de facto test for a First Amendment right of access.182 
A simple balancing test for access is especially appealing to judges 
because it offers greater flexibility than the more stringent requirements 
outlined in Globe Newspaper and the Press-Enterprise cases.183 In fact, 
this was the approach put forth by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Press-
Enterprise II.184 Yet the Court has been reluctant to adopt ad hoc 
balancing in First Amendment cases because such tests are highly 
subjective and open ended.185 Furthermore, balancing tests cannot 
account for the presumption of public access the First Amendment 
requires. A majority of the Court rejected this approach in Press-
Enterprise II, preferring to apply a threshold test focused on the benefits 
of openness followed by an assessment of whether the interests 
supporting closure are compelling.186 
Two circuit court decisions in cases involving public access to 
deportation proceedings illustrate the problems that invariably follow 
when courts engage in ad hoc balancing under the logic prong. In 
 
limitation of First Amendment freedom as a substitute for an assessment of whether access 
plays a positive role in the functioning of summary jury trials); Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 210 
F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (balancing fair trial concerns against the value of access 
as part of the logic prong); B.H. v. Ryder, 856 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (considering 
a number of logistical complications in opening the particular conferences in question and 
failing to articulate whether a right attached in the first place). Some courts skip any analysis of 
the benefits of access and go straight to the disadvantages. See, e.g., Ky. Press Ass’n v. Kentucky, 
355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 864 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (considering only the drawbacks of public access to 
juvenile delinquency proceedings and concluding that “opening juvenile proceedings would 
frustrate the purpose of juvenile court” by “depriv[ing] the juvenile of a fair trial” and 
“diminish[ing] . . . [the] prospect for rehabilitation”). 
 182 As Raleigh Hannah Levine notes, courts that apply this “atypical logic prong 
analysis . . . consistently . . . find[] that the proceeding fails the logic prong and that no access 
right attaches.” Levine, supra note 27, at 1743. 
 183 See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to ‘The Right to Know’?: Access to 
Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1137 
(1987) (noting the flexibility offered by a balancing test). 
 184 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 185 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2010) (“The Government thus 
proposes that . . . ‘[w]hether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection 
depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.’ As a 
free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling and dangerous. The 
First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that 
survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” (citations omitted)). 
 186 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7–9. 
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Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,187 members of the press and public 
brought actions against the U.S. Attorney General seeking a declaration 
that the closure of “special interest” deportation proceedings after the 
attacks on September 11, 2001 violated their First Amendment right of 
access.188 The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment claim by concluding that the case would be governed by 
the experience and logic test, rejecting the government’s argument that 
the test is inapplicable to deportation proceedings.189 As to the first 
prong of the test, the court found that a wealth of evidence supported 
the conclusion that deportation proceedings historically have been 
open.190 
Turning to the logic prong, the Sixth Circuit concluded that 
“[p]ublic access undoubtedly enhances the quality of deportation 
proceedings.”191 According to the court, “public access acts as a check 
on the actions of the Executive by assuring us that proceedings are 
conducted fairly and properly”; “openness ensures that government 
does its job properly [and] that it does not make mistakes”; and, “after 
the devastation of September 11 and the massive investigation that 
followed,” open deportation proceedings “serve a ‘therapeutic’ purpose 
as outlets for ‘community concern, hostility, and emotions.’”192 Quoting 
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Globe Newspaper, the Sixth Circuit also 
remarked that public access to deportation proceedings “helps ensure 
that ‘the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute 
to our republican system of self-government.’”193 As to this latter 
benefit, the court went on to observe: 
 
 187 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 188 Id. at 682–83. On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a 
directive to all United States Immigration Judges requiring closure of “special interest” cases. 
Id. at 683. The directive required that “all proceedings in such cases be closed to the press and 
public, including family members and friends.” Id. at 684. 
 189 Id. at 695. According to the court, the experience and logic test is not limited solely to 
criminal proceedings and other courts have properly applied the test to administrative 
proceedings. Id. (citing United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(university’s student disciplinary board proceedings); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177–79 (6th Cir. 1983) (civil action against administrative agency); 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil trial); Whiteland Woods, 
L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (municipal planning meeting); 
Cal–Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (agriculture 
department’s voters list); Soc’y of Prof. Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D. 
Utah 1985) (administrative hearing), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 190 Id. at 701–03 (noting that the first general immigration act was enacted in 1882; the 
tradition had been to conduct open deportation proceedings, and deportation proceedings have 
been presumptively open to the public by statute since 1965). 
 191 Id. at 703. 
 192 Id. at 703–04 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)). 
 193 Id. at 704 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)). 
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“[A] major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.” Public access to deportation 
proceedings helps inform the public of the affairs of the government. 
Direct knowledge of how their government is operating enhances the 
public’s ability to affirm or protest government’s efforts. When 
government selectively chooses what information it allows the public 
to see, it can become a powerful tool for deception.194 
Having found a First Amendment right of access to deportation 
hearings, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the closure of all “special 
interest” deportation proceedings, while justified by a compelling 
interest in national security,195 was not “narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.”196 According to the court, the government’s wholesale closure 
of these deportation proceedings was over-inclusive and 
indiscriminate.197 If a hearing will disclose information that is likely to 
harm national security, that information “could be kept from the public 
on a case-by-case basis through protective orders or in camera 
review.”198 
Following closely on the heels of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Detroit Free Press, the Third Circuit considered a nearly identical set of 
facts in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (NJMG).199 In NJMG, 
a consortium of media organizations also sought access to “special 
interest” deportation hearings.200 Just as the Sixth Circuit had done, the 
Third Circuit concluded that the case was governed by the experience 
and logic test, but it came to the opposite conclusion regarding whether 
the test was satisfied.201 Whereas the Sixth Circuit had found ample 
evidence that deportation proceedings have historically been open to the 
public,202 the Third Circuit concluded that the hearings failed the 
experience prong.203 Applying an exceedingly high standard for 
evaluating a history of access, the Third Circuit concluded that while 
deportation hearings have been presumptively open since at least 1964, 
when federal regulations began to provide explicitly for public access, “a 
 
 194 Id. at 704–05 (alterations in original) (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604). 
 195 Id. at 707. 
 196 Id. at 705 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07). 
 197 Id. at 708. 
 198 Id. 
 199 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 200 Id. at 199. 
 201 Id. at 204–05. 
 202 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 203 NJMG, 308 F.3d at 214–15. 
ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2017  6:33 PM 
870 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:835 
 
recent—and rebuttable—regulatory presumption is hardly the stuff of 
which Constitutional rights are forged.”204 
Although the Third Circuit found that a lack of a history of access 
to deportation proceedings was enough to doom the petitioners’ First 
Amendment access claim,205 the court went on to consider whether the 
logic prong was satisfied. It is in the Third Circuit’s analysis of the logic 
prong that we see the depth of the problem with the way many courts 
approach the logic of openness. Instead of considering the interests 
supporting secrecy in its analysis of whether the closure of the 
proceedings survived strict scrutiny, the Third Circuit concluded that 
the arguments for closure “are equally applicable to the question 
whether openness, on balance, serves a positive role in removal 
hearings.”206 Acknowledging that such an approach would result in 
“overlap between the Richmond Newspapers logic prong and the 
subsequent ‘compelling government interest’ strict scrutiny 
investigation necessary upon a finding of a First Amendment access 
right,” the court reasoned that this double counting was proper because 
it “would simply require that the policy rationales supporting openness 
be even more compelling than those supporting closure.”207 
By requiring that the rationales supporting openness must be more 
compelling than the interests supporting closure, the Third Circuit 
turned the right of public access on its head. Under Richmond 
Newspapers and its progeny, the courts are presumed to be open to the 
public.208 Accordingly, public access is the default unless countervailing 
interests justify closure. Yet under the Third Circuit’s approach, courts 
are to start with the presumption that court proceedings are closed and 
must remain so unless the benefits of public access are more compelling 
than the interests supporting closure.209 By flipping the presumption of 
access, the Third Circuit has stacked the deck in favor of closure. 
But the Third Circuit’s approach is even more pernicious because 
of the way the court went about evaluating the relevant interests. In 
assessing whether “openness, on balance, serves a positive role in 
removal hearings,”210 the Third Circuit did not consider the positive and 
 
 204 Id. at 213. The Third Circuit also rejected the argument that despite “undeniable 
similarities” between deportation proceedings and criminal and civil trials, the case law did not 
support a right of public access to deportation proceedings. Id. at 214–15. 
 205 Id. at 215–16. 
 206 Id. at 217. 
 207 Id. at 217 n.13. 
 208 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 209 See NJMG, 308 F.3d at 217 n.13 (conceding that the court’s approach “require[s] that the 
policy rationales supporting openness be even more compelling than those supporting 
closure”). 
 210 Id. at 217. 
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negative aspects of open deportation hearings generally. Instead, it 
weighed the benefits of public access to deportation proceedings as a 
general matter against the negative impacts of public access solely in the 
“special interest” cases singled out for closure by the government.211 In 
other words, the Third Circuit evaluated whether any deportation 
hearings should be open by focusing only on cases where the interests in 
closure were strongest. As Heidi Kitrosser observes, the Third Circuit’s 
application of the logic prong “takes analysis designed to determine 
whether special factors overcome a general access presumption in 
particular cases and uses such analysis to determine whether a general 
access right exists in the first place.”212 Judge Scirica made this very 
point in his dissent, arguing that while closure might be warranted in 
specific cases, “the demands of national security under the logic prong 
of Richmond Newspapers do not provide sufficient justification for 
rejecting a qualified right of access to deportation hearings in 
general.”213 “To conclude otherwise,” he warned, “would permit 
concerns relevant only to a discrete class of cases to determine there is 
no qualified right of access to any of the broad range of deportation 
proceedings.”214 This is, of course, precisely what the majority did under 
the logic prong in NJMG. 
As the preceding discussion shows, there are deep flaws in the 
experience and logic test which have led courts to engage in ad hoc 
balancing to determine whether a First Amendment right of access 
exists. To be sure, some evaluation of the reasons why closure would be 
beneficial must be undertaken when considering the logic of public 
access, but even if public access has a negative impact on a particular 
proceeding, that does not necessarily mean that the interests in closure 
outweigh the advantages that public access provides in all hearings of 
that type. 
4.     Common-Law Access and the Dilemma of Court Records 
As in many areas of First Amendment law, how a court decides the 
threshold question of whether a First Amendment right is implicated 
will largely determine whether public access is required at all. Although 
most courts acknowledge that the public can also have a common-law 
 
 211 Judge Scirica noted this problem in his dissent: “At [the experience and logic test] stage, 
we must consider the value of openness in deportation hearings generally, not its benefits and 
detriments in ‘special interest’ deportation hearings in particular.” Id. at 225 (Scirica, J., 
dissenting).  
 212 Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 125. 
 213 NJMG, 308 F.3d at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
 214 Id. 
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right of access to court proceedings and their associated records,215 there 
is an enormous difference between the standard a judge must employ 
when considering common-law access claims compared to claims 
premised on the First Amendment. Whereas the First Amendment 
requires that restrictions on access must be necessary to serve a 
compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest,216 a 
judge need only find under the common law that the interests in closure 
outweigh the interests in access.217 Moreover, when there is no First 
Amendment right of access, judges who impose restrictions on public 
access are granted broad deference by reviewing courts and are typically 
subject only to an “abuse of discretion” standard when they restrict 
access.218 
Most of the case law regarding a common-law right of access to the 
courts has arisen in the context of disputes over court records and 
dockets.219 The Supreme Court’s only pronouncement on a common-
law right of access to the courts came in Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc.,220 which preceded by two years the Court’s 
decision in Richmond Newspapers, recognizing a First Amendment right 
of access to criminal trials.221 In Nixon, the press sought access to tape 
recordings that had been introduced as evidence at the trial of several of 
 
 215 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (recognizing a 
federal common law “right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents” (footnote omitted)). 
 216 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). 
 217 See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602; United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143, 153–55 (2d Cir. 
2001); United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 409–10 (6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, unlike a First 
Amendment right of access, a common law right can be supplanted by statute. See, e.g., Ctr. for 
Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he common 
law right of access is preempted by FOIA.”). 
 218 See, e.g., United States v. McDougal, 103 F.3d 651, 657 (8th Cir. 1996); Belo Broad. Corp. 
v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1981). There is some disagreement among the federal 
courts of appeal as to whether they should apply a more searching review than abuse of 
discretion. See Graham, 257 F.3d at 148–49 (discussing the disagreement among the circuits but 
deciding that it could leave the decision to another day because the panel would affirm the 
district court’s decision under either an abuse of discretion standard or a more stringent 
standard); Beckham, 789 F.2d at 412–13 (applying more searching review); United States v. 
Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1981) (same). 
 219 See Joe Regalia, The Common Law Right to Information, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 89, 
101–03 (2015). Indeed, there are only a few cases delineating the common-law right of access to 
court proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Tex. 
1996) (“[T]he right of the public to attend civil trials is grounded in the First Amendment as 
well as the common law.”); Sentinel Star Co. v. Edwards, 387 So. 2d 367, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (“The press and public had a common law right of access to the hearing.”); In re 
Conservatorship of Brownstone, 594 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (App. Div. 1993) (“The statutory and 
common law of this State have long recognized that civil actions and proceedings should be 
open to the public in order to ensure that they are conducted efficiently, honestly, and fairly.”). 
 220 435 U.S. 589. 
 221 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
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President Nixon’s former advisors on charges of conspiring to obstruct 
justice in connection with the Watergate investigation.222 Although the 
trial court made transcripts of the recordings available, the press argued 
that the public should be able to hear the actual conversations, replete 
with nuance and inflection.223 
As discussed in Section I.A, the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that the First Amendment mandated disclosure of the 
tapes.224 Nevertheless, the Court did conclude that the common-law 
right to “inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents,” extended to the tapes.225 The Court 
emphasized, however, that this common-law right was not absolute. 
According to the Court, “[e]very court has supervisory power over its 
own records and files” and, even when a common-law right of access 
exists, a court can deny access to its files when they “might . . . become a 
vehicle for improper purposes.”226 Although the Court conceded that 
the balance of interests was close, it found that the Presidential 
Recordings Act, which provides an administrative procedure for the 
press to seek release of the tapes, tipped the scale against ordering their 
disclosure from the trial court’s files.227 The Court also remarked that 
the public had a chance to listen to the contents of the tapes at the time 
they were played in open court and requiring release of the physical 
copies would raise the “danger that the court could become a partner in 
the use of the subpoenaed material ‘to gratify private spite or promote 
public scandal,’ with no corresponding assurance of public benefit.”228 
By focusing on the public availability of the transcripts, the Court 
sidestepped the question of whether the First Amendment provided a 
right of access to the tapes.229 Because the tapes had already been played 
 
 222 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 592–94. 
 223 Id. at 600. 
 224 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 225 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597 (footnote omitted). 
 226 Id. at 598. 
 227 Id. at 600–02. President Nixon, who argued against making the tapes available, asserted a 
property interest in the tapes, a right to privacy, and executive privilege. Id. He also highlighted 
the “unseemliness” of a court facilitating the commercialization of the tapes. Id. at 602. “On 
respondents’ side of the scales,” the Court noted, “is the incremental gain in public 
understanding of an immensely important historical occurrence that arguably would flow from 
the release of aural copies of these tapes, a gain said to be not inconsequential despite the 
already widespread dissemination of printed transcripts.” Id. 
 228 Id. at 603 (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893)). The Court also noted that the 
proper method for seeking physical copies of the tapes was through the Presidential Recordings 
Act. Id. 
 229 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609. According to the Court,  
the press—including reporters of the electronic media—was permitted to listen to the 
tapes and report on what was heard. Reporters also were furnished transcripts of the 
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in open court, the Court determined that “[t]here is no question of a 
truncated flow of information to the public.”230 The only issue the Court 
saw with regard to the First Amendment was whether “copies of the 
White House tapes—to which the public has never had physical access—
must be made available for copying.”231 Seeing this as a case about 
special access for the press, the Court held that “[t]he First Amendment 
generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superior 
to that of the general public,” which could have listened to the tapes in 
the courtroom.232 In framing the issue as it did, however, the Court left 
open the possibility that the First Amendment might have been 
implicated if the trial court had refused to provide any public access to 
the contents of the tapes.233 
The Court’s decision eight years later in Press-Enterprise II could 
have settled the question of whether a First Amendment right of access 
extends to trial exhibits and other judicial records,234 but the Court 
inexplicably failed to do so. In Press-Enterprise II, a magistrate judge 
excluded the press and public from a forty-one day preliminary hearing 
in a murder case.235 At the conclusion of the closed hearing, the judge 
refused to release the transcript and sealed the hearing record.236 As 
discussed in greater detail in Section I.A, the Supreme Court applied the 
experience and logic test to the hearing in question and concluded that 
it satisfied both prongs of the test for a First Amendment right of 
access.237 Rather confusingly, however, the Court analyzed the logic of 
openness by discussing access to both the preliminary hearing and to 
the transcript of the hearing as if they were indistinguishable for 
purposes of satisfying the public’s right of access under the First 
 
tapes, which they were free to comment upon and publish. The contents of the tapes 
were given wide publicity by all elements of the media.  
Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 234 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 235 Id. at 3–4. 
 236 Id. at 4–5. 
 237 Id. at 13. 
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Amendment,238 yet the Court’s statement of its holding mentions only a 
First Amendment right of access to the preliminary hearing itself.239 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court’s analysis in Press-Enterprise II 
left the lower courts uncertain as to whether the First Amendment right 
of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, and 
the Press-Enterprise cases extends to judicial records. A review of the 
many cases involving public access claims to court records reveals that 
the courts have largely taken one of three approaches to the question of 
public access: some courts bypass a First Amendment inquiry and 
simply apply a common-law test for access;240 other courts analyze 
whether a First Amendment right applies to the record in question by 
examining whether the judicial proceeding that the record is associated 
with passes the experience and logic test;241 and still other courts apply 
the experience and logic test to the court record itself.242 In fact, several 
federal circuits cannot seem to make up their minds and apply more 
than one approach.243 
Because of these divergent approaches to resolving disputes over 
public access, it is possible that a court proceeding could be subject to a 
First Amendment right of access—with the attendant requirement that 
closure must pass strict scrutiny and survive narrow tailoring—but the 
documents associated with that proceeding are subject only to a 
common-law right that leaves their fate to the discretion of the trial 
 
 238 Compare id. at 12–13 (“[T]he absence of a jury, long recognized as ‘an inestimable 
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the complaint, biased, or 
eccentric judge,’ makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even more 
significant.” (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968))), with id. at 13 (“Denying 
the transcript of a 41-day preliminary hearing would frustrate what we have characterized as 
the ‘community therapeutic value’ of openness.” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) (plurality opinion))). 
 239 Id. (“We therefore conclude that the qualified First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as they are conducted in California.”). 
 240 See, e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Howard v. State, 291 P.3d 137, 142 (Nev. 2012). 
 241 See, e.g., United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359–60 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 340, 342–44 (6th 
Cir. 1987); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389–90 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 242 See, e.g., Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Oregonian Publ’g 
Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 
224, 229 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 
F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (3d Cir. 1985); 
Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 243 Compare Antar, 38 F.3d at 1359–60 (applying experience and logic test to court records), 
with Smith, 776 F.2d at 1111–12 (applying experience and logic test to proceeding associated 
with records); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92–96 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying 
experience and logic test to court dockets), with In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (applying experience and logic test to proceeding associated with records). 
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court.244 Of course, the converse situation can occur as well in which 
there is a First Amendment right of access to the documents but not to 
the proceeding itself.245 This can lead to some anomalous results where 
the public has only partial access to the workings of the courts.246 
Returning to our earlier criticism of the Supreme Court’s 
experience and logic test, we can see that the test is particularly ill suited 
to dealing with public access claims directed at court records. Court 
records may not share the same history of public access as court 
proceedings and, as to the logic of public access, the interests implicated 
by public access to court proceedings and their associated records may 
be quite different. In fact, the test may point in opposite directions. For 
example, even when a court proceeding has traditionally been closed to 
the public, there may still be a history of public access to the transcript 
of the proceeding.247 Similarly, under the logic prong, allowing public 
access to a court proceeding might affect its functioning, but with the 
 
 244 See, e.g., Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 228–29 (finding only a common-law right of access to pre-
trial sentence reports despite First Amendment right of access to the proceedings); United 
States v. Gotti, 322 F. Supp. 2d 230, 249–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing First Amendment 
right of access to sentencing hearing but finding no right of access to presentence letters sent 
directly to the court); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933, 938–39 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1986) (noting that even if a First Amendment right of access applies to civil trials, the 
“limited” common-law access right to the judicial records meant that the records could be 
sealed at the court’s discretion), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987). 
 245 See, e.g., Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573 (finding no First Amendment right of access to search 
warrant proceedings but nevertheless determining that a First Amendment right attaches to 
documents filed in support of search warrants); Edwards, 823 F.2d at 117–19 (finding no First 
Amendment right of access to mid-trial questioning of jurors regarding potential misconduct, 
but holding that a right of access attached to the transcript of the hearing); United States v. 
Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that closure of voir dire in 
terrorism trial did not violate First Amendment right of access so long as transcript was 
released). 
 246 See Antar, 38 F.3d at 1360 (“It would be an odd result indeed were we to declare that our 
courtrooms must be open, but that transcripts of the proceedings occurring there may be 
closed, for what exists of the right of access if it extends only to those who can squeeze through 
the door?”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding First 
Amendment right of access to criminal court records and stating, “[i]f the press is to fulfill its 
function of surrogate, it surely cannot be restricted to report on only those judicial proceedings 
that it has sufficient personnel to cover contemporaneously”). But see United States v. 
McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“There is not yet any definitive Supreme Court 
ruling on whether there is a constitutional right [in addition to the common-law right] of 
access to court documents and, if so, the scope of such a right.”). 
 247 See, e.g., United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1362 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (“There well may be 
situations in which a proper weighing of the public’s interest and the interests of the juvenile 
will call for a denial of access to a hearing and nevertheless require access at a later point to the 
transcript of that hearing.”); Edwards, 823 F.2d at 116–18 (“We conclude that the first 
amendment guarantees a limited right of access to the record of closed proceedings concerning 
potential jury misconduct and raises a presumption that the transcript of such proceedings will 
be released within a reasonable time.”); Alvarez v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 864–65 
(Ct. App. 2007) (applying California statute that required closure of grand jury proceedings but 
granted public access to post-indictment grand jury transcripts). 
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passage of time those concerns may dissipate and, thus, access to the 
transcript or other records would not necessarily have the same effect 
on the logic of openness.248 
Given the confusion in the lower courts about the experience and 
logic test’s applicability and appropriate application to court records, 
many courts disregard the two-part test just as we saw in the context of 
court proceedings, and either engage in an outright balancing of 
interests,249 or ignore the First Amendment completely and apply the 
common-law test for access.250 
Although the common-law test does force judges to start with a 
presumption of public access, it grants them too much discretion to 
restrict access. As others have observed, “[t]here are virtually no clear 
standards [under the common law] guiding the court’s decision, and the 
determination is inherently fact-based.”251 Remarking on the 
discretionary nature of the common-law balancing test, the Supreme 
Court wrote in Nixon: 
It is difficult to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a 
comprehensive definition of what is referred to as the common-law 
right of access or to identify all the factors to be weighed in 
determining whether access is appropriate. . . . [T]he decision as to 
access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a 
 
 248 See, e.g., B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We do not hereby deny the 
public a right of access to information about the in-chambers hearings; rather, we hold only 
that the public has no right to follow the negotiators into the negotiation room. . . . Moreover, 
as we noted supra, the public will have access to records of the in-chambers conferences 
[afterwards].”). 
 249 See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, 706 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating that a 
First Amendment right of access to court records exists, but explicitly applying a balancing test 
to determine if sealing was permissible); Mancheski v. Gabelli Grp. Capital Partners, 835 
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing First Amendment right of access, but 
concluding that the court’s “task involves weighing the interests of the public against the 
interests of the parties”). 
 250 See, e.g., In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1990); In re 
Application of Kan. City Star Co., 143 F.R.D. 223, 227 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Ashworth v. Bagley, 
351 F. Supp. 2d 786, 789 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
 251 Regalia, supra note 219, at 103; see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 
599 (1978) (“[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, 
a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular 
case.”); United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e think the decision as 
to [common-law] access is properly handled on an ad hoc basis by the district judge, who is in 
the best position to recognize and weigh the appropriate factors on both sides of the issue.”); 
United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The proper balancing of the 
foregoing factors is a matter which is vested in the first instance in the sound discretion of the 
trial court.”); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A]ll parties agree that 
release of the tapes is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court . . . .”); Belo Broad. 
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 430–31 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Only an egregious abuse of discretion 
should merit reversal.” (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 614 (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
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discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.252 
In practice, the common law’s reliance on the discretion of trial 
courts results in far too many closure orders. Take the case that opened 
the introduction to this Article, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc.253 In 
a lawsuit involving a discrimination claim under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, the trial court imposed what can only be described 
as extreme measures to prevent public access to the case: the court 
allowed the plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously, closed all court 
proceedings, sealed all judicial records, and sealed the case docket.254 
When the defendant appealed the wholesale sealing and closure of the 
case, the Third Circuit devoted a single paragraph to the issue, stating: 
“[W]e review the grant or modification of a confidentiality order for an 
abuse of discretion. There was no abuse of discretion. The record fully 
supports the District Court’s order.”255 Presumably, the Third Circuit 
concluded that there was no reason to even consider whether the public 
had a First Amendment right to access any aspect of this case, including 
the summary judgment proceedings, their associated records, and the 
district court’s summary judgment decision.256 But we do not know 
because neither the district court nor the Third Circuit issued any public 
findings to support the closure of this case. The two perfunctory 
sentences at the end of the Third Circuit’s opinion provide the only 
public discussion of the issue. Even under the highly deferential 
common-law right of access, the question of public access deserves more 
analysis than this. 
Unfortunately, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. is not unique. 
In jurisdictions all across the country, trial courts maintain secret 
dockets containing thousands of cases, “often [on] mundane legal 
matters involving the rich and politically powerful.”257 For example, 
 
 252 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598–99. 
 253 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir.), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 254 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 255 C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 371 (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 
772, 783 (3d Cir. 1994)). The defendant also challenged the plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym. The 
Third Circuit spent little time disposing of this issue as well, noting in a footnote:  
Although we have yet to address the issue, the decision whether to allow a plaintiff to 
proceed anonymously rests within the sound discretion of the court. After a careful 
review of all the circumstances of this case (including the District Court’s thorough 
hearing), we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in granting Doe’s motion 
to proceed anonymously.  
Id. at 371 n.2 (citations omitted). 
 256 It is not possible to know what proceedings took place in the district court and what 
records were in the case file because the district court sealed the case docket, as well. 
 257 Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Twenty-
Nine Media Organizations in Support of Petitioners at 11, N.Y. Law Publ’g Co. v. Doe, 555 U.S. 
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following the Second Circuit’s decision in Hartford Courant Co. v. 
Pellegrino invalidating the state’s practices on First Amendment 
grounds,258 the State of Connecticut unsealed more than 10,000 cases on 
its secret docket, most of which “comprised divorce or family law 
matters involving state officials, judges, prominent attorneys, corporate 
officers, and celebrities.”259 Even within the federal system, there are 
thousands of cases that are being adjudicated in secret, although it is 
impossible to know how many. A survey by the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) “found that most district courts 
surveyed admitted to having secret civil cases pending.”260 Although 
many district courts would not say how many cases they had, the RCFP 
reported that “[a]s of June 2003, the Middle District of Georgia had 33 
secret civil cases pending, the Northern District of Florida had seven 
secret civil cases pending, the Western District of Arkansas and the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin each had two secret civil cases 
pending.”261 
As with C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., we often hear about these 
cases only when an appellate court issues a public decision addressing 
some aspect of the case. In a lawsuit that bears shockingly similar 
procedural facts to C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., the Fourth Circuit 
reversed a district court’s sealing of the entire record in Doe v. Public 
Citizen and stated: 
By sealing the entire docket sheet during the pendency of the 
litigation, as the district court permitted in this case, courts 
effectively shut out the public and the press from exercising their 
constitutional and common-law right of access to civil proceedings. 
But there is a more repugnant aspect to depriving the public and 
press access to docket sheets: no one can challenge closure of a 
document or proceeding that is itself a secret. . . . Because access to 
docket sheets is integral to providing meaningful access to civil 
proceedings, we hold that the public and press enjoy a presumptive 
right to inspect docket sheets in civil cases under the First 
Amendment.262 
 
1013 (2008) (No. 08-330), 2008 WL 4618213, at *11 [hereinafter Amicus Brief in Support of 
Petitioners].  
 258 Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 259 Meliah Thomas, Comment, The First Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1537, 1552 (2006). 
 260 Rory Eastburg, Nothing to See Here, NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter 2009, at 34. 
 261 Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioners, supra note 257, at 12 (quoting SARA THACKER, 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SECRET JUSTICE: SECRET DOCKETS 5 (2003), 
http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/SJDOCKETS.pdf). 
 262 Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. 
Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that secret dockets are “inconsistent with 
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Cases like Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. and Doe v. Public 
Citizen lead one to wonder how it is possible that more than thirty years 
after the Supreme Court remarked in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia that “[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and 
press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of 
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit 
guarantees,”263 so many courts continue to reject the proposition that 
the public has a constitutional right to observe the activities of the 
courts. Clearly, the message from Richmond Newspapers has not been 
fully received. 
The Supreme Court’s conditional, ad hoc approach to public access 
is at least partially to blame and is in need of substantial reformulation. 
The lower courts appear to be hopelessly confused as to when the 
experience and logic test applies outside of the narrow confines of 
criminal trials and trial-like proceedings. Moreover, the test itself is too 
indeterminate to provide courts with meaningful guidance in resolving 
public access claims. As a result, many courts either engage in an 
unstructured balancing test that discounts the benefits of public access 
or they simply default to the common-law test for access. 
The deficiencies with the current doctrinal framework for a public 
right of access to the courts, however, mask a deeper underlying 
problem with the Court’s access jurisprudence: the lack of a coherent 
theoretical basis for a First Amendment right of public access in the first 
place. The next Parts provide this theoretical grounding and outline an 
analytically consistent public access doctrine that advances the First 
Amendment values at stake in disputes over public access to the courts. 
II.     FIRST AMENDMENT STRUCTURALISM 
The confusion and inconsistency regarding a right of public access 
to the courts is not simply a doctrinal issue that can be fixed by fine-
tuning the experience and logic test. The problem is more fundamental 
and stems from uncertainty over why the First Amendment should have 
anything to say about access to the courts in the first place. In other 
words, why does public access to the courts advance First Amendment 
values? Until we answer this question, we cannot ascertain the proper 
scope of a First Amendment right of access. 
Part of the challenge in answering this question is that the values 
advanced by the First Amendment are contested. Indeed, scholars have 
 
affording the various interests of the public and the press meaningful access” to judicial records 
and proceedings). 
 263 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
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long debated the purposes underlying the First Amendment.264 It is not 
my aim here to crown a single unifying theory of the First Amendment. 
Instead, my goal is to identify a theory (or set of theories) that explains 
the Supreme Court’s recognition of a First Amendment right of public 
access to criminal trials, can serve as a basis for extending that right to 
other judicial activities, and can guide courts in deciding hard cases. 
In the following Sections, I argue that a right of public access to the 
courts flows from the recognition that the First Amendment’s speech 
and press protections are intended to ensure that Americans are capable 
of self-governance, a rationale most closely associated with Alexander 
Meiklejohn, but also advanced by a number of First Amendment 
scholars including Robert Post and Cass Sunstein.265 Section A examines 
the relevance of this theory to public access claims and explains how a 
First Amendment right of access to the courts plays a critical structural 
role in our constitutional system. Section B then elucidates the 
structural values of court transparency and translates those values into 
insights that can help courts resolve public access disputes. 
A.     The First Amendment’s Purpose and Structural Role 
Although the text of the First Amendment is mute about its 
purposes, we can assume that the admonition that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”266 is based 
on the belief that protecting speech and the press will have salutary 
effects on America’s “great experiment in democracy.”267 Precisely how 
the framers envisioned the First Amendment playing this role, however, 
remains a mystery. The historical record is nearly as mute about the 
purposes of the First Amendment as the text is itself.268 
 
 264 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877, 877 (1963) [hereinafter Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment] 
(“Despite the mounting number of decisions and an even greater volume of comment, no really 
adequate or comprehensive theory of the first amendment has been enunciated, much less 
agreed upon.”); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 
1017 (2015) (noting the need “to identify a unified statement of free speech theory”). 
 265 See infra notes 282–88 and accompanying text. 
 266 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 267 CARL BECKER, OUR GREAT EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES, at x (1920) (“American ‘democracy’ was, and is, an experiment . . . .”); see also 1 ALEXIS 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 12 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d ed., London, Saunders 
& Otley 1838) (1835). 
 268 See 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 20.5(a) (5th ed. 2012) (“There is little that anyone can draw from 
the debates within the House concerning the meaning of the First Amendment. In addition, 
there is the absence of useful records of debates in the Senate—or the states—on its 
ratification.” (footnotes omitted)); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 
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1.     Theories of the First Amendment 
Despite a lack of historical evidence regarding the First 
Amendment’s purposes, scholars and jurists have largely coalesced 
around three theories justifying the First Amendment’s protections for 
speech.269 The first and perhaps most widely recognized justification for 
protecting speech is the advancement of knowledge or truth,270 which 
has come to be embodied by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous 
metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas.”271 A second theory posits that free 
speech should be protected because it advances individual autonomy 
and self-fulfillment.272 The third theory asserts that the First 
Amendment’s purpose is to facilitate self-governance and participatory 
democracy.273 Although some scholars have identified a fourth 
justification for the First Amendment—to serve as a check on 
 
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2016) [hereinafter Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment] 
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause has the most shallow and obscure history of any provision of the 
First Amendment.”). 
 269 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 32 (2012) [hereinafter Bhagwat, Details]; Tsesis, supra note 264, at 1016. Because the 
Supreme Court has largely eschewed giving the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause 
independent meaning, see David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 
(2002) (“[A]s a matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in 
protecting the freedom of the press.”), I focus only on the theoretical justifications for the Free 
Speech Clause. 
 270 See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 755–56 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))). 
 271 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market . . . .”). The first articulation of the marketplace theory is typically attributed to poet 
John Milton, who criticized the English system of licensing in Areopagitica in 1644:  
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth 
be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her 
strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a 
free and open encounter?  
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (Jim Miller ed., Dover Thrift ed. 2016) (1644). 
 272 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47–69 (1989) 
(arguing that speech is protected because it “promotes both the speaker’s self-fulfillment and 
the speaker’s ability to participate in change”); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, supra note 264, at 879 (describing freedom of expression’s role in “[t]he 
achievement of self-realization”). 
 273 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–65 
(1993) (contending that free speech is a “precondition” for democracy); Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–21 (1971) (arguing 
that freedom of speech is necessary for “democratic organization”); Robert Post, Reconciling 
Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2362 (2000) 
[hereinafter Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine] (“The democratic theory of the First 
Amendment . . . protects speech insofar as it is required by the practice of self-government.”). 
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government274—for our purposes this theory is subsumed by the self-
governance theory.275 
The Supreme Court has never definitively adopted one theory over 
the others and each has its merits.276 Moreover, there are echoes of all of 
them in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, with the justices 
drawing on different theories depending on the nature of the First 
Amendment conflict at issue. Nevertheless, as I describe below, the self-
governance theory best explains the Court’s recognition of a right of 
access to the courts. 
The self-governance theory rests on the conviction that speech is a 
necessary precondition for a representative democracy. While scholars 
and jurists point to other values that are advanced by the First 
Amendment, few would dispute that a democracy cannot function 
without protections for speech about the government. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Mills v. Alabama, “[w]hatever differences may exist 
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically 
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”277 Since Mills, the 
Court has continued to emphasize the importance of speech to self-
governance,278 including most recently in Snyder v. Phelps, where the 
Court held that the First Amendment provides a defense to a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress when the speech at issue 
 
 274 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) [hereinafter Blasi, Checking Value] (discussing “the value that free 
speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in checking the abuse of power by public 
officials”). 
 275 See infra notes 282–88 and accompanying text. 
 276 See, e.g., Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 273, at 2372 (“First 
Amendment jurisprudence contains several operational and legitimate theories of freedom of 
speech, so that it is quite implausible to aspire to clarify First Amendment doctrine by 
abandoning all but one of these theories.”); Tsesis, supra note 264, at 1017 (“The Supreme 
Court has been inconsistent in its application [of free speech theory], and, indeed, has never 
definitively adopted one over the others.”). 
 277 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
 278 See, e.g., Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) 
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, 
who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words and deeds, will 
reflect its electoral mandate.”); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 
2288 (2012) (“Our cases have often noted the close connection between our Nation’s 
commitment to self-government and the rights protected by the First Amendment.”); Brown v. 
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“At the core of the First Amendment are certain basic 
conceptions about the manner in which political discussion in a representative democracy 
should proceed.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]he central 
purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was to assure a society in which ‘uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open’ public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in 
such a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish.” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). 
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relates to “a matter of public concern.”279 According to the Court, 
“[s]peech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection,’”280 and “speech concerning public affairs is 
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”281 
Given the Court’s repeated statements that discussion of 
government affairs is at the core of the First Amendment’s protections, 
a broad consensus has emerged among constitutional scholars that the 
primary purpose of the First Amendment is to make self-governance 
possible.282 This position has been adopted by a wide range of scholars, 
including Ashutosh Bhagwat,283 Robert Bork,284 Alexander 
Meiklejohn,285 Robert Post,286 Cass Sunstein,287 and James Weinstein.288 
This is not to say that there is unanimity as to the precise contours 
of the self-governance theory. Indeed, there continues to be deep 
disagreement over how broadly speech relating to self-governance 
should be defined. At least initially for Meiklejohn, such speech would 
have to be explicitly political.289 This exceedingly narrow definition 
faced significant criticism from a number of quarters,290 and Meiklejohn 
ultimately revised his theory, concluding that speech about education, 
 
 279 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011). 
 280 Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 
(1985) (plurality opinion)). 
 281 Id. at 452 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). 
 282 See KOHLER ET AL., supra note 85, at 61 (noting that the self-governance theory has 
“come to dominate the field”); BeVier, supra note 26, at 502 (“[T]here is one principle [in the 
First Amendment area] which both commands widespread agreement and is derived from 
constitutional structure: the core first amendment value is that of the democracy embodied in 
our constitutionally established processes of representative self-government.”); Bhagwat, The 
Democratic First Amendment, supra note 268, at 1102 (“[A] broad consensus has emerged over 
the past half-century regarding the fundamental reason why the Constitution protects free 
speech: to advance democratic self-governance.”). 
 283 Bhagwat, Details, supra note 269, at 32–44; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Comment, Patronage and 
the First Amendment: A Structural Approach, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1384–91 (1989) 
[hereinafter Bhagwat, Patronage and the First Amendment]. 
 284 Bork, supra note 273, at 20–21. 
 285 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 30, at 75; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an 
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255. 
 286 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011); 
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 670 (1990). 
 287 SUNSTEIN, supra note 273, at 121–65. 
 288 James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech 
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2011). 
 289 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
105–07 (1948). 
 290 See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government. By 
Alexander Meiklejohn. New York: Harper Bros., 1948, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899 (1949) (book 
review) (“The most serious weakness in Mr. Meiklejohn’s argument is that it rests on his 
supposed boundary between public speech and private speech.”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–16. 
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philosophy, science, literature, and the arts could also be necessary for 
self-governance.291 Today, the debate largely revolves around defining 
the modes of self-government, with scholars such as Robert Post 
advancing what he calls the “participatory” theory, which “does not 
locate self-governance in mechanisms of decision making, but rather in 
the processes through which citizens come to identify a government as 
their own.”292 
For our purposes, we need not resolve these debates because under 
any definition of self-governance, public discussion about the activities 
of the courts, a coordinate branch of government, would fall within even 
the narrowest conception of democratic speech. But concluding that the 
First Amendment protects speech about the courts only gets us part of 
the way to understanding why the First Amendment should incorporate 
a right of public access to information from the courts. To grasp the 
nature of this link, we have to examine the structural role that the First 
Amendment plays in the American constitutional system. 
2.     Constitutional Structuralism 
Constitutional structuralism proceeds from the insight that we 
should interpret the Constitution by examining the structures of 
government; i.e., the Constitution’s overall arrangement of offices, 
powers, and relationships.293 In the words of Laurence Tribe: 
To understand the Constitution as a legal text, it is essential to 
recognize the sort of text it is: a constitutive text that purports, in the 
name of the People of the United States of America, to bring into 
being a number of distinct but interrelated institutions and practices, 
 
 291 Meiklejohn, supra note 285, at 256–57. 
 292 Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 273, at 2367; see also POST, supra note 
22, at 61; Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1116–18 (1993). 
 293 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC 
QUESTIONS 120 (2007) (“The phrase ‘constitutional structures’ usually refers to the 
constitutional relationships between the national government and the states, the branches of 
the national government, the government and the people and, in sum, the general arrangement 
of offices, powers, and relationships allegedly manifest in the Constitution’s text and the settled 
facts of constitutional history.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: 
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1236 
(1995) (“I put such great emphasis upon text and structure, both the structure within the text—
the pattern and interplay in the language of the Constitution itself and its provisions—and the 
structure (or architecture) outside the text—the pattern and interplay in the governmental 
edifice that the Constitution describes and creates, and in the institutions and practices it 
propels.” (emphasis added)). 
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at once legal and political, and to define the rules governing those 
institutions and practices.294 
Charles Black and John Hart Ely, two of the more influential 
proponents of structural interpretation, have both offered convincing 
arguments for considering constitutional rights within a structural 
context.295 In a series of lectures entitled Structure and Relationship in 
Constitutional Law, Black implored his audience “to develop a full-
bodied case-law of inference from constitutional structure and 
relation.”296 According to Black, difficult constitutional cases are 
resolved “not fundamentally on the basis of . . . textual exegesis which 
we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total 
structure which the text has created.”297 Ely makes a similar argument 
when he asserts that the Constitution and Bill of Rights were intended to 
be blueprints for government rather than repositories of specific values; 
“the body of the original Constitution is devoted almost entirely to 
structure,” he observed.298 For Ely, this insight led him to conclude that 
the First Amendment was “intended to help make our governmental 
processes work, to ensure the open and informed discussion of political 
issues, and to check our government when it gets out of bounds.”299 
The First Amendment serves a structural function by facilitating 
the communicative processes necessary for democratic self-governance. 
The Amendment’s speech protections, for example, prevent the 
government from stifling criticism of public officials and ensure that 
debate on public issues can be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”300 
Other provisions, such as the rights of assembly, association, and 
petition, serve similar ends by helping to alleviate collective-action 
problems that can undermine the effective exercise of popular 
sovereignty.301 Taken together, the interrelated freedoms in the First 
 
 294 Tribe, supra note 293, at 1235. 
 295 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1969); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).  
 296 BLACK, supra note 295, at 8. 
 297 Id. at 15. Responding to potential criticism that structural interpretation would be too 
imprecise and speculative, Black said:  
The question is not whether the text shall be respected, but rather how one goes 
about respecting a text of that high generality and consequent ambiguity which 
marks so many crucial constitutional texts. I submit that the generalities and 
ambiguities are no greater when one applies the method of reasoning from structure 
and relation.  
Id. at 30–31. 
 298 ELY, supra note 295, at 90. 
 299 Id. at 93–94. 
 300 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 301 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 543 
(2009); see also Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 743 (2002); Ozan 
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Amendment serve critical structural purposes in our constitutional 
system. 
The Supreme Court has long relied on structural insights to 
interpret the First Amendment. In fact, one cannot make sense of 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence without acknowledging the 
Court’s reliance on the structural role of the First Amendment. For 
more than a century after ratification of the First Amendment, the 
consensus among jurists and scholars was that the Amendment’s reach 
was quite limited, prohibiting only prior restraints on speech.302 Even 
Justice Holmes, in a decision that predated his famous defense of the 
First Amendment in Abrams v. United States,303 initially believed that 
the First Amendment imposed no limits on the government’s ability to 
levy criminal penalties against publishers.304 It was not until well into 
the twentieth century that the Supreme Court settled on a broader 
interpretation of the First Amendment, and it has gradually expanded 
the First Amendment’s ambit ever since. 
During the 1930s, for example, the Court moved from the cramped 
understanding of the First Amendment as applying only to prior 
restraints and began striking down government penalties directed at 
speech, noting that “free political discussion” plays an essential role in 
“our constitutional system” and remarking that in such discussion “lies 
the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional 
government.”305 Further emphasizing the role that speech plays under 
the Constitution, the Court also began to expand the First Amendment’s 
protections to cover indirect forms of government censorship, such as 
 
O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 37–39) (on file 
with author).  
 302 See David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 34 (2013) [hereinafter Ardia, Freedom of Speech] (discussing early American 
conceptions of the First Amendment). 
 303 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think that we should be eternally 
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be 
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful 
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”). 
 304 See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (affirming 
criminal contempt sanction against the publisher of the Rocky Mountain News and concluding 
“the main purpose of [the First Amendment’s free speech protections] is ‘to prevent all such 
previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by other governments’” (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825))). 
 305 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (invalidating criminal conviction for 
subversive speech); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the 
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential 
to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”). 
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the imposition of a licensing tax on newspaper publishers306 and 
restrictions on the right to receive information.307 
In the 1960s, the Court further expanded the reach of the First 
Amendment by imposing constitutional limitations on the common-law 
of defamation. Explicitly invoking the structural role that speech plays 
in a democracy, the Court proclaimed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
that even false speech about public officials is deserving of First 
Amendment protection.308 In what has become an essential part of the 
First Amendment canon, the Court remarked that the First Amendment 
embodies “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”309 
Quoting extensively from the writings of James Madison, the Court in 
Sullivan observed that the “Constitution created a form of government 
under which ‘The people, not the government, possess the absolute 
sovereignty.’”310 Agreeing with Madison about the critical role that 
speech plays in self-government, the Court concluded: “The right of free 
public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus . . . a 
fundamental principle of the American form of government.”311 
Echoes of this view can also be heard in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions today.312 Cautioning against allowing the government to 
dictate what information should be available to the public, Justice 
Douglas observed that “[t]he generation that made the nation thought 
secrecy in government one of the instruments of Old World tyranny 
and committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function 
unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up 
 
 306 See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249–50 (1936) (stating that “informed public 
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment” and concluding that the First 
Amendment protects not only against prior restraints but also “any action of the government 
by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems 
absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights”). 
 307 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306 (1965) (“Just as the licensing or taxing 
authorities in the Lovell, Thomas, and Murdock cases sought to control the flow of ideas to the 
public, so here federal agencies regulate the flow of mail.”); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 143 (1943) (noting that “freedom of speech and press has broad scope” and holding that 
“[t]his freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to 
receive it” (citation omitted)). 
 308 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). “The Court was concerned that public officials could stifle free 
debate by bringing defamation actions against their critics, much as they had stifled debate 
using the Sedition Act of 1798.” David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting 
the Social Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 280 (2010). 
 309 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 310 Id. at 274. 
 311 Id. at 275. 
 312 See, e.g., Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) 
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, 
who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words and deeds, will 
reflect its electoral mandate.”). 
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to.”313 “This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism,” 
the Court warned in National Archives and Records Administration v. 
Favish, “[i]t defines a structural necessity in a real democracy.”314 
We can draw three important conclusions from the preceding 
discussion. First, a primary purpose of the First Amendment is to make 
self-governance possible. Second, self-governance is not feasible without 
informed public discourse about the government. Third, the First 
Amendment plays an essential structural role in our constitutional 
system because it ensures that citizens can engage in expressive activities 
that are essential to self-government. The self-governance theory and 
constitutional structuralism, therefore, are mutually reinforcing. While 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open discussion of government affairs 
may be beneficial in its own right, its value from a structuralist 
perspective is that it makes self-government possible. 
B.     The Structural Values of Court Transparency 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court had never held that the First 
Amendment provides a right of access to information of any kind. 
Instead, the Court seemed to view the question of whether the public 
should have access to information, including information held by the 
government, as a political issue beyond the purview of the courts.315 
Even after Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court has continued to 
reject the notion that there is a general First Amendment right of access 
to government information.316 It is only in the context of criminal trial 
and trial-like proceedings that the Court has explicitly held that the First 
Amendment requires a right of public access.317 
What is it about criminal court proceedings that explains this 
disparate treatment under the First Amendment? The following 
Sections examine the underpinnings of the Court’s recognition of a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials and the values that are 
advanced by public access to the courts. As discussed below, the 
 
 313 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772–73 
(1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 314 541 U.S. 157, 171–72 (2004) (citing Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 
773). 
 315 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (concluding that a claim of access to a 
county jail “invites the Court to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the 
Constitution has left to the political processes”). 
 316 See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United 
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999). 
 317 See supra Section I.A.3. 
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judiciary, by virtue of its unique institutional position within the 
government, possesses information that is essential to informed self-
government. By elucidating the distinctive characteristics of the courts 
and the information they contain, we will be able to understand the 
justification—and potential limits—of a First Amendment right of 
access to information about the courts. 
1.     The First Amendment as Sword 
The First Amendment, as we have already noted, is mute about its 
purposes. History is similarly inscrutable as to what role, if any, the First 
Amendment was intended to play in ensuring that the public has access 
to information about the workings of the government. The framers do 
not appear to have ever confronted the question of whether the 
Constitution guarantees a right of access to information about the 
government, and the issue did not arise in the Supreme Court until well 
into the twentieth century. In the absence of guidance from the text and 
history of the First Amendment, we are left to reason from the structure 
of government established by the Constitution in order to assess 
whether a right of public access to the courts is demanded by the 
principles underlying the First Amendment’s protections for speech. 
Because speech related to self-governance is at the core of the First 
Amendment’s protections, the Supreme Court, at least since 1931,318 has 
roundly condemned government efforts to restrict or punish speech 
about the government, including speech about the activities of the 
courts.319 But this does not establish that the First Amendment requires 
the government to provide access to information in its possession. 
There still remains an important conceptual jump from the conclusion 
that the First Amendment prohibits the government from punishing 
speech about the government (absent sufficiently compelling reasons) to 
the conclusion that the First Amendment requires the government to 
provide access to information about its activities. When the government 
 
 318 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (applying First Amendment to 
invalidate state law restricting speech). 
 319 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (invalidating restriction on 
the publication of name of youth charged as a juvenile offender); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating restrictions on the disclosure of information 
regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission); Okla. Publ’g. Co. v. Dist. 
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (invalidating restriction on the publication of name or picture of 
minor child involved in juvenile proceeding); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) 
(invalidating restrictions on the publication or broadcasting of pre-trial accounts of admissions 
made by defendant to law enforcement officers); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975) (invalidating restriction on publication of rape victim name acquired from court 
records).  
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refuses to provide access to information in its possession, it neither 
directly restrains nor imposes punishment on information-gathering 
activities. To justify the conclusion that the First Amendment requires 
the government to provide public access to the courts, one must 
conclude that the First Amendment embodies an affirmative 
constitutional obligation to ensure that public discussion of 
governmental affairs is informed. 
Although the question of whether the First Amendment embodies 
a general affirmative right to information continues to be vigorously 
debated by scholars,320 the Supreme Court already has made this leap in 
the context of public access to certain criminal proceedings. The Court’s 
decisions in Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, and Press-
Enterprise I & II go beyond the view that the First Amendment only 
prohibits government censorship to encompass a right to acquire 
information from the courts. It cannot be overstated how important 
these cases were and how sharply they diverged from the Court’s earlier 
decisions that had rejected a First Amendment right of access to 
government information.321 Justice Stevens remarked on the 
significance of the Court’s shift in his concurring opinion in Richmond 
Newspapers: 
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually 
absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but 
never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy 
matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever. . . . I 
agree that the First Amendment protects the public and the press 
from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the 
operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch . . . .322 
While Stevens was right that Richmond Newspapers was a 
watershed case, there are earlier hints of an affirmative First 
Amendment right to information in the opinions of various justices, 
many of whom adopted Meiklejohnian and Madisonian rhetoric. Recall, 
for example, that in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court suggested that “news 
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections.”323 And, 
although a three-justice plurality in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. held that 
 
 320 Compare, e.g., Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, supra note 26, at 5–14 
(arguing that a complete “system of freedom of expression” must include an affirmative First 
Amendment right of access to information), with BeVier, supra note 26, at 516–17 (“The 
Constitution yields no normative standard by which the claim of access to governmental 
information can be evaluated.”). Barry McDonald offers a thorough recounting of the historical 
debate on this issue and its contemporary resonance. See generally McDonald, supra note 43. 
 321 See supra Sections I.A.1–I.A.2. 
 322 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582, 584 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 323 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). 
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the First Amendment did not mandate a right of access to prisons,324 
Justice Stevens’s impassioned dissent joined by Justices Brennan and 
Powell asserted that “[t]he preservation of a full and free flow of 
information to the general public has long been recognized as a core 
objective of the First Amendment,”325 and “[w]ithout some protection 
for the acquisition of information about the operation of public 
institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the process of self-
governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its 
substance.”326 
Given this view of the First Amendment, it is not surprising that 
when Justice Brennan penned the majority opinion in Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Superior Court, he wrote that “[u]nderlying the First Amendment 
right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that ‘a 
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs,’” and that “[b]y offering such protection, the First 
Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively 
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-
government.”327 Indeed, Brennan had made a similar argument in his 
Richmond Newspapers concurrence where he linked the First 
Amendment’s purpose to its “structural role” of “fostering . . . self-
government.”328 Brennan went on to explain what this meant: 
Implicit in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” but 
also the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate—as well 
as other civic behavior—must be informed. The structural model 
links the First Amendment to that process of communication 
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not 
only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable 
conditions of meaningful communication.329 
Although the Court’s decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe 
Newspaper relied explicitly on the structural values advanced by court 
access, the Court muddled the theoretical justifications for a First 
 
 324 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 325 Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 326 Id. at 32. 
 327 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (quoting Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
 328 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
 329 Id. at 587–88 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the U.S., Address at the Dedication of the S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and 
Justice in Newark, New Jersey (Oct. 17, 1979) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the structure 
of communications necessary for the existence of our democracy.”). 
ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2017  6:33 PM 
2017] C O U RT  T R AN S P AR E N C Y  893 
 
Amendment right of access in the Press-Enterprise cases. While the 
outcomes in Press-Enterprise I & II support structuralist ends, the means 
the Court used to achieve those ends do not comport with a structuralist 
perspective of the First Amendment.330 First, Chief Justice Burger, who 
wrote the majority opinions in both cases, did not adopt the expansive 
language that Brennan and Stevens had used in describing the need for 
public access. The advantages Burger articulates, enhancing the fairness 
of criminal proceedings, assuring public confidence in the justice 
system, and checking potential abuses of judicial power,331 do not 
directly advance the democracy-enhancing structural goals of the First 
Amendment, although his reference to the “community therapeutic 
value”332 of public access might be seen as doing so. By focusing on the 
instrumental benefits of public access, Burger left the impression that 
the First Amendment right of access to the courts rests solely on the 
benefits that public access provides in individual cases.333 
Second, the experience and logic test that Burger announced and 
applied in Press-Enterprise II further obscures the locus of a 
constitutional right of access to the courts. In making a right of access 
contingent on “whether public access plays a significant positive role in 
the functioning of the particular process in question,”334 Burger offered 
too cramped a view of the “logic of openness,” focusing only on the role 
that public access plays in individual court proceedings and eschewing a 
broader structural perspective that considers how public access 
advances democratic values. As a result, the Press-Enterprise cases have 
left the lower courts confused as to which benefits matter most when 
considering public access claims: the advantages that public access 
confers on a specific proceeding, the benefits that transparency provides 
for the court system as a whole, or the structural values that access 
 
 330 See Joseph F. Kobylka & David M. Dehnel, Toward a Structuralist Understanding of First 
and Sixth Amendment Guarantees, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 363, 386–87 (1986). 
 331 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 
(1984). 
 332 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508. 
 333 Justice Stevens commented on this very point in his concurrence in Press-Enterprise I: 
The focus commanded by the First Amendment makes it appropriate to emphasize 
the fact that the underpinning of our holding today is not simply the interest in 
effective judicial administration; the First Amendment’s concerns are much broader. 
The “common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters 
relating to the functioning of government,” that underlies the decision of cases of this 
kind provides protection to all members of the public “from abridgment of their 
rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including 
the Judicial Branch.” 
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 517 (citations omitted). 
 334 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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serves by exposing the public to information necessary for self-
governance. 
In fact, it makes little sense to base a First Amendment right of 
access on the benefits that public access provides to individual court 
proceedings, or even to the court system as a whole. While a just and 
effective court system is undoubtedly an important public good, it is not 
a core First Amendment value. Public access takes on First Amendment 
significance because it advances the First Amendment’s structural 
purpose. To wit, public access is of constitutional significance because it 
makes self-government possible. By putting the structural goals of the 
First Amendment in the foreground, we can arrive at a much clearer 
understanding of the justifications for—and potential limits of—a First 
Amendment right of access. 
2.     Higher-Order Constitutional Values 
There is much to be said about the benefits of court transparency. 
Over the years judges and scholars have identified a variety of benefits 
that flow from allowing the public to observe the activities of the courts, 
including: (1) safeguarding the integrity of the fact-finding process;335 
(2) ensuring the fairness of judicial proceedings;336 (3) educating the 
public about the implementation and impact of the law;337 (4) 
promoting public confidence in the justice system;338 (5) supporting the 
development of the common law;339 (6) informing the public about 
important safety and welfare issues;340 and (7) fostering discussion about 
 
 335 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“Public 
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding 
process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.”). 
 336 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509 (“[P]ublic proceedings vindicate the concerns 
of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for 
their criminal conduct . . . .”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313–14 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(noting that public access to court documents advances “the public’s interest in assuring that 
the courts are fairly run and judges are honest” (quoting Crystal Grower’s Corp. v. Dobbins, 
616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980))). 
 337 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting “the 
educational and informational value of public observation” of court records). 
 338 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508 (“Openness thus enhances both the basic 
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in 
the system.”). 
 339 See Symposium, Panel Discussion Judicial Records Forum, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1735, 
1745–46 (2015) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (Kenneth J. Withers asserting that access to 
court proceedings and records reveals how court decisions are made so that the basis for 
precedent is available for future litigants and courts to use in the development of the common 
law). 
 340 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[T]he right of 
inspection serves to produce ‘an informed and enlightened public opinion.’” (quoting Grosjean 
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matters of public concern.341 Public access even provides therapeutic 
benefits to the community, as Chief Justice Burger noted in Richmond 
Newspapers: 
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread 
acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that 
public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even 
without such experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed 
from experience and observation that, especially in the 
administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice 
must have the support derived from public acceptance of both the 
process and its results.342 
Although this is just a partial list, it highlights the broad range of 
benefits that can arise from public access to the courts. Not all of these 
benefits, however, support the recognition of a First Amendment right 
of access. Indeed, even a cursory review of the list above reveals that 
some of the purported advantages of public access serve only 
functionalist ends. 
In order to identify which benefits provide support for a First 
Amendment right of access, it will be helpful to characterize the 
potential benefits of public access in terms of the type of impact they 
have: “first-order benefits” impact the functioning of specific court 
proceedings, “second-order benefits” affect the judicial system as a 
whole, and “third-order benefits” influence society broadly. 
a.     First-Order Benefits 
Public access to the courts clearly provides significant first-order 
benefits and, indeed, this is where much of the attention has typically 
been directed in the debate over a First Amendment right of access. 
Judges and scholars have long recognized the first-order benefits that 
flow from public access to court proceedings, including keeping 
witnesses, judges, and other trial participants honest;343 generating 
 
v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247 (1936))), rev’d sub nom, Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 
435 U.S. 598 (1978). 
 341 See, e.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (“The operation 
of the Virginia Commission, no less than the operation of the judicial system itself, is a matter 
of public interest, necessarily engaging the attention of the news media.”). 
 342 448 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 343 See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (observing that open 
access “promotes public confidence in the judicial system by enhancing testimonial 
trustworthiness and the quality of justice dispensed by the court”); Ex parte Capital U-Drive-It, 
Inc., 630 S.E.2d 464, 469 (S.C. 2006) (“Public access discourages perjury and encourages 
bringing the truth to light because participants are less likely to testify falsely in a sunlit 
courtroom before their neighbors than in a private room before court officials.”). 
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additional witnesses and evidence;344 and, in the criminal context, 
dissuading the government from engaging in unjust prosecutions.345 
First-order benefits obviously serve functionalist ends by 
improving the operation of court proceedings. This is not to denigrate 
the importance of these instrumental benefits. In fact, courts should put 
great value on improving the fairness and functioning of court 
proceedings. But that does not mean that the First Amendment should 
require public access in order to secure these benefits. While first-order 
benefits might implicate other important rights,346 they do not directly 
advance the core justificatory theories underlying the First 
Amendment’s speech and press clause guarantees.347 
b.     Second-Order Benefits 
Second-order benefits, which affect the functioning of the court 
system as a whole, also flow from providing public access to the courts. 
Public access, for example, promotes public confidence in the justice 
system,348 supports the development of the common law,349 and enables 
lawyers and parties to improve their arguments and predict the 
outcomes of their cases.350 Public access also impacts the efficiency of 
the courts by decreasing the filing of frivolous claims and increasing the 
likelihood of settlements.351 In addition, public access plays an 
important role in exposing and reducing bias and corruption within the 
court system. Public access, especially to court records, makes it more 
 
 344 See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (“[A] public trial encourages witnesses 
to come forward and discourages perjury.”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948) (“Public 
trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties.”); United States ex rel. 
Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969) (“[A] public trial may lead, even 
accidentally, to the appearance of an important witness who, having heard the testimony, may 
come forward with relevant new evidence . . . .”). 
 345 See, e.g., Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 437 (1979) 
(noting that public access to court proceedings protects an accused from “unjust persecution 
[sic] by public officials”). 
 346 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. 
 347 See supra Section II.A.1 for a discussion of the various theories underlying the First 
Amendment. 
 348 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“Openness thus enhances both the 
basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public 
confidence in the system.”). The moral authority of judges, upon which their power is largely 
based, is dependent upon the public’s trust, which cannot be gained or retained without public 
oversight. 
 349 See Panel Discussion, supra note 339, at 1745–46. 
 350 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 498–510 (2009) 
(describing how increased court transparency leads to better predictions of litigation 
outcomes). 
 351 It is also believed that public access to the courts will reduce the frequency of legal 
malpractice because lawyers will be able to observe and learn from the mistakes of others. See 
id. at 510–13. 
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likely that systemic problems will be identified, corrected, and 
deterred.352 As the California Supreme Court observed: “If public court 
business is conducted in private, it becomes impossible to expose 
corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism.”353 
Again, these are laudable benefits. But like first-order effects, they 
serve functionalist goals in improving the functioning of the court 
system and do not directly support the recognition of a First 
Amendment right of access to the courts. 
c.     Third-Order Benefits 
As we move into identifying the third-order benefits of public 
access, we begin to see how public access to the courts can advance the 
structural values underlying the First Amendment. Third-order benefits 
include informing the public about the exercise of governmental power, 
educating individuals about the implementation and impact of the law, 
and fostering discussion about matters of public concern. These 
benefits, which extend beyond the justice system itself, play an 
important structural role in our constitutional system by increasing 
citizens’ ability to exercise self-governance.354 
Public access to the courts, for example, makes it possible for 
individuals to know what laws govern them. Although the courts are 
often thought of merely as an instrument for resolving disputes, that 
misunderstands their importance in the American legal system. As 
every first-year law student discovers, statutes—and constitutions—are 
full of vague standards. Those standards do not begin to take on 
concrete meaning until the courts interpret and implement them. Public 
access to the courts, especially the raw materials with which the courts 
 
 352 Lynn LoPucki, who has done important work in this area, describes how researchers can 
use statistical tools to analyze case outcomes, noting that such tools can determine if judge-to-
judge differences are attributable to the judges themselves or random differences in the cases 
assigned to the judges. Id. at 494–95; see also MD. COURTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS at 7, http://www.courts.state.md.us/access/finalreport3-02.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2016) (“Access to court records, and especially electronic court records, enables 
the public to learn of, and correct, lapses in the system—whether these take the form of 
injustice in an individual civil or criminal case or in a previously unrecognized pattern of 
cases.”).  
 353 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 360 n.28 (Cal. 1999) 
(quoting In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (Ct. App. 1977)). 
 354 Not all third-order effects advance structuralist goals. For example, public access to the 
courts informs the public about important safety and welfare issues. See supra notes 340–42 and 
accompanying text. In addition, access to information about businesses and individuals who 
are involved in criminal and civil cases allows members of the public to make better-informed 
decisions about what products to buy, where to work, who to hire, and who to take on as 
tenants, among other things. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, 
supra note 352, at 7. These are all important societal benefits, but they do not directly advance 
the First Amendment’s structural goals. 
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work (e.g., evidence, witnesses, legal arguments), is essential for the 
public to understand the application of the law and the mechanisms by 
which it is formed.355 As the D.C. Circuit stated: 
A court proceeding, unlike the processes for much decisionmaking 
by executive and legislative officials, is in its entirety and by its very 
nature a matter of legal significance; all of the documents filed with 
the court, as well as the transcript of the proceeding itself, are 
maintained as the official “record” of what transpired.356 
The courts also provide a crucial forum where disputes over the 
proper application of government power are aired and, at least in some 
cases, resolved. Courtroom fights over the excessive use of police force 
make police tactics visible.357 Lawsuits over the safety of drugs, 
automobiles, and other products reveal the research behind these widely 
used products and allow the public to assess their societal costs and 
benefits.358 In fact, court cases are full of experts on every conceivable 
issue, from DNA sequencing to the safety of automobile ignition 
switches. As Lynn LoPucki has noted, “the courts are among the most 
information-rich institutions in society.”359 
It is important to recognize, however, that a structuralist 
justification for a First Amendment right of access to the courts does not 
turn on whether public access to a particular court proceeding or 
record—standing alone—would advance democratic self-governance. 
This distinction marks a critical difference between structuralist and 
functionalist justifications for court transparency. Many judges and 
scholars who support a right of public access to the courts focus on the 
 
 355 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The basis for this 
[First Amendment] right is that without access to documents the public often would not have a 
‘full understanding’ of the proceeding and therefore would not always be in a position to serve 
as an effective check on the system.” (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st 
Cir. 1984))); Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data, 
Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 859 (2008) (“[E]ffective public understanding and 
scrutiny of the judicial process require access to rulings of the court and to documents filed by 
parties.”). 
 356 Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 357 See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Baltimore Reaches $6.4 Million Settlement with Freddie 
Gray’s Family, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/
baltimore-reaches-64-million-settlement-with-freddie-grays-family/2015/09/08/80b2c092-
5196-11e5-8c19-0b6825aa4a3a_story.html (reporting on the settlement of tort claims against 
the city of Baltimore, nearly five months after twenty-five-year-old was critically injured in 
police custody, sparking days of protests and rioting). 
 358 See, e.g., Marie McCullough, Cancer Questions over Popular Diabetes Drugs Raise Furor, 
INQUIRER (Phila.) (Feb. 19, 2016, 3:31 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/health/cancer/
20160221_Cancer_questions_over_popular_diabetes_drugs_raise_furor.html (reporting on 
lawsuit against Merck claiming the company did not disclose the side effect of taking Januvia, 
the company’s blockbuster diabetes drug). 
 359 LoPucki, supra note 350, at 510. 
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benefits that accrue from the public dissemination of specific types of 
information. Under this approach, public access is justified only when 
the information the pubic gains is relevant to a matter of public concern. 
If a court proceeding or record involves solely “private matters,” public 
access is assumed to serve no societal benefit. 
Structuralists, on the other hand, see public access as justified 
regardless of whether the specific information gained by the public 
relates to a matter of public concern because what the public is 
observing is the exercise of judicial power. In other words, the structural 
benefits of public access transcend individual cases. Civil, criminal, 
juvenile, and family law cases all involve the exercise of government 
power regardless of the identity of the litigants or the legal issues 
involved. 
Public access is therefore needed even in cases that do not appear 
to touch on issues of public concern. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
while still a jurist on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
captured this understanding of the need for public access in Cowley v. 
Pulsifer, where he affirmed the privilege to report on court proceedings: 
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the 
public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another 
are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that 
those who administer justice should always act under the sense of 
public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy 
himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is 
performed.360 
Not surprisingly, functionalist and structuralist justifications can 
lead to different approaches to the question of court access. 
Functionalists tend to rely on balancing tests to assess whether First 
Amendment interests should be favored over other interests in 
particular cases.361 Although these balancing tests can vary in the 
importance they assign to First Amendment values, the key 
distinguishing feature of a functionalist approach is that it views an 
informed public as only one value a court must consider when non-
speech interests are implicated by public access.362 
For structuralists, informed public discourse is the preeminent 
value because all other values rest on the capacity of citizens to self-
govern. While not discounting the beneficial role that public access 
 
 360 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). Although Holmes is referring to the role 
that public access plays in ensuring the accountability of judges, the government as a whole is 
also held accountable by providing public access to the courts, regardless of whether individual 
cases are considered to be of public concern. 
 361 See supra Section I.B.3. 
 362 Kobylka & Dehnel, supra note 330, at 369–71. 
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plays in specific court proceedings, a structuralist approach looks past 
individual court proceedings to focus on the broader public interest 
served by the dissemination of information about the courts, which play 
a uniquely important structural role in our constitutional system.363As 
described below, this may result in public access rights taking 
precedence in cases that would not pass a functionalist’s balancing test, 
but such a result is deemed necessary to preserve higher-order values. 
3.     Court Transparency and Self-Governance 
Public access to the courts is essential if the public is to understand 
the contours and operation of their government. The courts are a 
central locus where government policies are contested, where rights are 
recognized or disavowed, and where social change is often implemented 
or delayed. Because the public is generally precluded from observing the 
internal deliberations of government, public access to the courts helps to 
mitigate the informational asymmetry that exists between citizens and 
the government,364 an asymmetry that challenges the very notion of 
democratic control. James Madison, the drafter of the First 
Amendment, understood the need for an informed populace when he 
warned that “popular government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, 
perhaps both.”365 
As Madison recognized, public understanding of the distribution 
of power between citizens and the government and between the various 
branches of government is a precondition for any system of self-
government. The entire theory of self-governance that animates the 
First Amendment rests on this basic insight about the link between 
informed public discourse and citizen sovereignty. In the words of 
Alexander Meiklejohn: 
The welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues 
shall understand them. . . . Just so far as, at any point, the citizens 
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information 
or opinion . . . which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result 
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It 
is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against 
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.366 
 
 363 See infra Section II.B.4. 
 364 See Varol, supra note 301 (manuscript at 36). 
 365 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 366 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 30, at 26–27. 
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Although many of our most consequential legal, social, and 
political issues are debated in the courts, information that is relevant to 
self-governance does not arise only in controversial cases. The issues 
that are contested in the courts—even in apparently mundane cases—as 
well as the manner in which these disputes are addressed and resolved 
by the courts are of public concern because every case involves the 
exercise of government power. In her influential work on the benefits of 
open courts, Judith Resnik asked, “[w]hat is the utility of having a 
window into the mundane as well as the dramatic?”367 According to 
Resnik, even ordinary legal disputes play an important role in informing 
the public about the exercise of governmental power: 
That is where people live and that is where state control can be both 
useful and yet overreaching. The dense and tedious repetition of 
ordinary exchanges is where one finds the enormity of the power of 
both bureaucratic states and private sector actors. That power is at 
risk of operating unseen. The redundancy of various claims of right 
and the processes, allegations, and behaviors that become the 
predicates to judgments can fuel debate not only about the responses 
in particular cases but also about what the underlying norms ought 
to be.368 
Resnick goes on to provide examples of disputes that have 
traditionally been considered as outside customary public discourse and 
explains how public awareness of how the courts treat these issues can 
generate new rights and limitations: 
So-called “domestic violence” provides one ready example of the role 
of public processes in reorienting an understanding of what was once 
cabined as “private” and tolerated as within the familial realm. Civil 
and criminal litigation about violence against women has helped to 
shape an understanding of how gender-based violence is a 
mechanism of subordination and an abuse of power.369 
As Resnik suggests, public access to the courts can alert the public 
to the need for legal and governmental reforms, thus allowing 
democratic sovereignty to remain located in the people. Courts are the 
principal mechanism through which the government exercises a broad 
range of powers, including allocating rights, transferring assets, 
recognizing and reconfiguring families, authorizing the receipt of 
government benefits, regulating commercial transactions, and 
legitimizing violence against individuals who violate the criminal law. 
 
 367 Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 
5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 56 (2011). 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. 
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Court transparency allows the public to observe the exercise of these 
powers and to “see that law varies by contexts, decision makers, 
litigants, and facts.”370 Moreover, Resnik notes, the public and the 
parties involved “gain a chance to argue that the governing rules or their 
applications are wrong.”371 Public access to the courts thus instantiates 
the democratic promise that laws can change through public input. 
Although we might be skeptical that the public will make proper 
use of the information it gains from observing the courts,372 this does 
not negate the need for access in the first place. If citizens are the 
ultimate sovereigns, as the Constitution presupposes, they must have 
access to the information necessary to evaluate the actions of their 
government, whether they actually make use of this information or not. 
This fundamental principle underlies the First Amendment’s structural 
role as a facilitator of democratic control. The Constitution’s protections 
would be hollow indeed if the government were able to foreclose public 
access to the courts, which sit at the critical interface between the 
exercise of governmental power and the public, simply because the 
government feels that the public is incapable of making effective use of 
the information. Moreover, if the government were to manage public 
access to the courts in this way, it would rob the government of its 
legitimacy. As Robert Post warns, “[t]he public sphere can sustain 
democratic legitimation only insofar as it is beyond the grasp of 
comprehensive state managerial control.”373 For Post, “[a] state that 
controls our knowledge controls our minds.”374 
4.     The Unique Structural Role of the Courts 
At this point in our analysis, some readers may think that the 
courts are just another indistinct part of the government, and therefore 
the rationales for recognizing a First Amendment right of access to the 
courts apply equally well to the other branches of government. Although 
it may be the case that a First Amendment right of access should be 
 
 370 Id. at 61. 
 371 Id. 
 372 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 928–32 (2006) 
(questioning the existence of an interested public that needs and wants to be fully informed 
about the government). Self-governance also depends upon the existence of a virtuous and 
altruistic citizenry, see, for example, William P. Marshall, Religion As Ideas: Religion As 
Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 388 n.16 (1996), which some would say bears little 
resemblance to civic life today. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
 373 POST, supra note 22, at 19. 
 374 Id. at 33. 
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extended to other parts of the government,375 we need not go that far 
because the courts play a unique structural role in our constitutional 
system that makes a right of public access to the courts particularly 
compelling from the standpoint of self-governance. 
First, the courts do not exercise power in the same way the 
legislative and executive branches do. While all three branches are 
integral to the system of checks and balances created by the 
Constitution, the courts play a special role in the law-making process. 
Alexander Hamilton once remarked that the judiciary is “the least 
dangerous” branch because it has neither the ability nor the resources to 
create and enforce laws.376 Perhaps Hamilton forgot about the common 
law, but even in the realm of statutes and regulations, the courts in 
matters both mundane and momentous often serve as the final arbiters 
of the reach and interpretation of the law.377 Moreover, since Marbury v. 
Madison, the courts have assumed for themselves the final say in 
interpreting the Constitution’s provisions.378 
Despite this outsized power, the courts do not share the same 
democratic constraints that the legislative and executive branches do. 
Federal judges have lifetime tenure, as do many state court judges.379 
And even in states that do elect judges, most of these elections are non-
partisan or uncontested retention elections380 that do not subject the 
courts to the same political controls as the legislative and executive 
branches. “Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench 
by way of the ballot,” Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. observed in 
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.381 As he noted, “[p]oliticians are expected 
to be appropriately responsive to the preferences of their supporters,” 
 
 375 Other scholars have argued this. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 26, at 3 (concluding that the 
First Amendment should provide a right of access to all government institutions where it is 
necessary to ensure democratic control); McDonald, supra note 43, at 256–57 (asserting that 
the First Amendment should provide a right to gather information from the government and 
other sources). 
 376 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 377 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“Under our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, 
lawmakers—a coordinate branch of government.”). 
 378 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). To further cast doubt on Hamilton’s sanguine view of the 
courts, it should be noted that the courts are a significant and growing part of the government, 
both in terms of their reach and budget. “In 1850, fewer than forty federal judges worked at the 
trial level in the United States, . . . . [b]y 2000, more than 1700 trial-level judges worked in more 
than 550 federal courthouse facilities.” Resnik, supra note 367, at 68.  
 379 According to the American Bar Association, twelve states grant life tenure or use long-
term appointments of some type for their highest courts. See Fact Sheet, Am. Bar Ass’n, Fact 
Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States (Sept. 4, 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 380 Id. 
 381 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (affirming restrictions on judicial candidate’s right to 
personally solicit campaign funds in an election). 
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whereas this “is not true of judges.”382 To the contrary, “[a] judge 
instead must ‘observe the utmost fairness,’ striving to be ‘perfectly and 
completely independent.’”383 
Yet, in one of the great ironies of our constitutional system, the 
courts are tasked with ensuring that the other branches of government 
remain democratic.384 John Hart Ely, who has written extensively about 
constitutional structure, calls this the “representation-reinforcing” role 
of the judiciary, which involves “policing the mechanisms by which the 
system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually 
represent.”385 According to Ely, judges must guard against insiders using 
the system to “chok[e] off the channels of political change to ensure that 
they will stay in and the outs will stay out,” and against “representatives 
beholden to an effective majority . . . systematically disadvantaging some 
minority . . . thereby denying that minority the protection afforded 
other groups by a representative system.”386 
Second, the other branches of government operate more directly in 
the public eye. The work of the legislative branch, for example, typically 
involves some degree of public debate and results in published 
legislation that is broadly targeted. Legislative enactments, as well as 
their implementation by the executive branch, are therefore hard to 
shield from public view and the public is thus able to mobilize in 
response and to exercise control over the legislative and executive 
branches through the political process. Courts, on the other hand, 
resolve specific disputes that generally involve a small number of 
parties. And, as we saw in Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., courts 
sometimes do not even allow the public to see their decisions.387  
Moreover, although court rulings can have broadly felt effects, the 
public has no direct channels of political recourse to respond to the 
actions of the courts. Heidi Kitrosser describes the important distinction 
between political and adjudicative activities as follows: 
[O]ne can roughly distinguish political from adjudicative activities 
because political activities generally involve making or implementing 
broadly applicable policy decisions while adjudicative activities 
generally involve decisions regarding discrete litigants. Political 
activities are generally attached to avenues for political recourse 
while adjudicative activities are generally disconnected from or 
 
 382 Id. at 1667. 
 383 Id. (quoting Address of John Marshall (Dec. 11, 1829), in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF 
THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829–1830 615, 616 (1830)). 
 384 See Bhagwat, Patronage and the First Amendment, supra note 283, at 1386. 
 385 ELY, supra note 295, at 102. 
 386 Id. at 103. 
 387 527 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir.) (affirming sealing of case, including district court’s decisions), 
order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008).  
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connected only remotely to such avenues. Further, political activities 
are generally legitimized by their connection to political channels 
whereas adjudicative activities are generally legitimized by 
procedural constraints and other norms of reason and fairness in 
decision-making.388 
Kitrosser’s conclusion that adjudicative activities are legitimized by 
procedural constraints and norms of reason and fairness further 
supports the need for public access to the courts. Nearly all of the 
constraints imposed on the courts stem from due process and other 
procedural protections. The legitimacy of the courts therefore rests on 
the public’s assurance that these protections are being followed by 
judges, a fact that did not escape the framers who included a right to a 
public trial in all criminal cases and a right to a jury trial in civil cases 
under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments respectively.389 Judges also 
recognize that their legitimacy rests on public oversight. As Judge Frank 
Easterbrook has noted: “The political branches of government claim 
legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that withdraws an 
element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing 
decision look more like fiat and requires rigorous justification.”390 Recall 
Jeremy Bentham’s admonition quoted in the introduction that 
“[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice.”391 Bentham later explained why 
this is so: “It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.”392 Public 
access to the courts thus serves as an essential check on judges and, by 
extension, the power of government.393 
Third, the courts play an important performative role in a 
democracy. In the words of Judith Resnik, “[o]pen court proceedings 
enable people to watch, debate, develop, contest, and materialize the 
exercise of both public and private power.”394 This view is echoed by 
Robert Post, whose “participatory” theory of self-governance rests on 
“the processes through which citizens come to identify a government as 
 
 388 Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 134–35. 
 389 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 
MINN. L. REV. 639, 667–69, 678–79 (1973) (describing how the Seventh Amendment was 
intended to be a restraint on government power). 
 390 Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated by RTP L.L.C. 
v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2016).  
 391 BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 316.  
 392 Id. 
 393 Vincent Blasi has written extensively about the role of the First Amendment in checking 
government power. According to Blasi, “[t]he check on government must come from the power 
of public opinion, which in turn rests on the power of the populace to retire officials at the 
polls, to withdraw the minimal cooperation required for effective governance, and ultimately to 
make a revolution.” Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 274, at 539. 
 394 Resnik, supra note 367, at 54. 
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their own.”395 Indeed, the courts are, as Resnik points out, at the center 
of a range of democratic practices: “Courts can be sites in which 
democratic norms of equal treatment, of popular engagement with legal 
rulemaking, and of constrained government authority are put into 
practice.”396 As Resnik observes, the “normative obligations of judges in 
both criminal and civil proceedings to hear the other side, to welcome 
‘everyone’ as an equal, to be independent of the government that 
employs and deploys them, and to provide public processes 
enable . . . democratic discourse[].”397 
Finally, unlike the other branches of government, the work of the 
courts is fundamentally about the discovery and disclosure of 
information. Judges and juries sift through conflicting claims and base 
their decisions on evidence and arguments presented in “open court.”398 
In practical terms, the courts serve an “information forcing” role for the 
government because the courts are where government power is 
contested, defined, and ultimately actualized. As David Pozen notes: 
“The quintessential structural feature of the Constitution, the 
distribution of powers across the coordinate branches, serves as an 
information-forcing device. To fulfill its responsibilities, each branch is 
required both to give and receive information from the others.”399 This 
forced information sharing—among branches of the government and 
between the government and the people—is an essential part of our 
constitutional system. Courts, because of the nature of their work, sit at 
the critical interface between the government and the public. As a result, 
public access to the courts aids in legitimizing the exercise of all 
governmental powers. 
III.     AN ANALYTICALLY COHERENT PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE 
In this Part we move from theory to application. As the preceding 
discussion has shown, the central purpose of the First Amendment is to 
ensure that citizens can effectively participate in and contribute to our 
republican system of government. In order to effectuate this goal, the 
First Amendment must embody an affirmative right of access to the 
courts, which, by virtue of their unique institutional position, possess 
 
 395 Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 273, at 2367. 
 396 Resnik, supra note 367, at 4. 
 397 Id. at 53. 
 398 See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“The theory of 
our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and 
argument in open court . . . .”). 
 399 David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 300 (2010). 
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information that is essential for the public to evaluate governmental 
power and to act as sovereigns over the government.400 
Although the conclusion that the First Amendment embodies an 
affirmative right of access to the courts marks a significant expansion in 
our current understanding of the First Amendment’s scope, the 
implementation of such a right can proceed largely through the 
application of established First Amendment doctrines. As with other 
First Amendment rights, the right of public access would not be 
absolute. In evaluating public access claims, a court should start with a 
presumption that the public has a First Amendment right of access to all 
court proceedings and filed records that are material to a court’s 
exercise of its adjudicatory power. This presumption can, in appropriate 
circumstances, be overcome when the countervailing interests 
supporting secrecy are compelling. Before closure can be ordered, 
however, courts must conclude that the proposed restrictions are 
narrowly tailored and that there are no other alternatives to closure. 
The following Sections describe these requirements in greater 
detail. 
A.     Ensuring a Presumption of Public Access 
The Supreme Court’s experience and logic test should be 
abandoned and replaced with a presumption that the public has a First 
Amendment right of access to all court proceedings and filed records 
that are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power.401 As 
explained in Part I, the current test for deciding whether a First 
Amendment right of access attaches to a particular proceeding or record 
is not based on sound constitutional principles.402 Moreover, it fails to 
guide judges in difficult cases and leads to inconsistent results.403 
There are a number of benefits that would flow from adopting a 
presumptive First Amendment right of public access. First, it would 
eliminate the uncertainty regarding whether a First Amendment 
 
 400 See supra Section II.B. 
 401 For purposes of determining whether a right of access exists, proceedings and records 
should be considered material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power whenever they are 
relevant to the core judicial function of determining the facts and the law applicable to the case. 
Assessing the materiality of information is something that judges do in a wide range of 
contexts, including securities regulation, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 12:6 (4th ed. 2002), and perjury, see Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 
(1988) (stating that a false statement is material if it had “‘a natural tendency to influence, or 
was capable of influencing, the decision of’ the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed” 
(quoting Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (1956))). 
 402 See supra Section I.A. 
 403 See supra Section I.B. 
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standard or a common-law standard should govern access claims. No 
longer will courts need to scrutinize the history and logic of openness in 
order to determine whether the values underlying the First Amendment 
are implicated by public access to a particular court proceeding or 
record. Instead, courts will apply a single test for access and can 
immediately engage in the far more critical examination of whether the 
interests supporting secrecy are sufficiently compelling to justify 
closure. Raleigh Hannah Levine, who advocates applying a strict 
scrutiny test to all denials of public access to adjudicative proceedings, 
notes that applying such a rule would “offer consistency and clarity, 
protect judges so that they can make unpopular decisions, prevent the 
appearance and actuality of outcome-driven analyses, and stay flexible 
enough to allow closure in the limited cases in which it is genuinely 
necessary.”404 
Second, adopting a presumptive First Amendment right of access 
will send a clear signal to judges and the public that the work of the 
courts is both relevant and important to the public. As Vincent Blasi has 
noted, First Amendment doctrines that embody clear principles, such as 
the prohibition against prior restraints,405 have “thrust.”406 That is, their 
use “represents a notable value commitment that says much about how 
particular disputes will be adjudicated.”407 In comparison, Blasi points 
out that multi-factor balancing tests and context-dependent standards 
“do[] not provide a strong indication of how a particular dispute will be 
resolved.”408 This is not to say that the right of access must be absolute 
in order to serve this signaling function. Even a qualified right can 
communicate clear principles: 
A mode of analysis that emphasizes principles . . . can broaden the 
perspective of the decisionmaker and make the regulatory concerns 
of the moment seem less monumental. . . . A legal culture that talks 
and thinks in terms of principles is somewhat less likely, by virtue of 
that mode of discourse, to trivialize its ideals in the process of case-
by-case application, or lose the capacity to subject its ad hoc, 
pragmatic impulses to some form of discipline.409 
 
 404 Levine, supra note 27, at 1745. 
 405 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.”); see also Ardia, Freedom of Speech, supra note 302, at 34–38 
(discussing the differences between the First Amendment’s treatment of prior restraints and 
subsequent sanctions). 
 406 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
449, 473 (1985). 
 407 Id. 
 408 Id. 
 409 Id. at 474. 
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Third, a presumptive First Amendment right of access will force 
the proponents of closure to justify restrictions on public access by 
demonstrating that the restrictions on access are necessary to advance a 
compelling interest. Courts will not be able to fall back on ad-hoc 
balancing that tends to discount the values of openness, but will instead 
have to issue findings “specific enough that a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly entered.”410 As 
discussed below, the courts can draw guidance on performing this task 
from the large, and growing, body of First Amendment case law 
applying strict scrutiny.411 Of course, this will make closures less 
common, but that is in keeping with the Court’s directive that “[c]losed 
proceedings . . . must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs 
the value of openness.”412 
Applying a First Amendment right of public access to all court 
proceedings and filed records that are material to a court’s exercise of its 
adjudicatory power will undoubtedly result in an expansion of public 
access rights.413 Yet a number of lower courts already impose a First 
Amendment right of access outside the criminal trial context. In fact, 
lower courts have held that a First Amendment right of access applies to 
almost all pretrial, mid-trial, and post-trial criminal proceedings, 
including: suppression hearings,414 bail hearings,415 entrapment 
hearings,416 change of venue hearings,417 competency hearings,418 
hearings on the disqualification or withdrawal of counsel,419 judicial 
recusal hearings,420 plea hearings,421 hearings to reduce a sentence,422 
 
 410 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
 411 See infra notes 448–58 and accompanying text. 
 412 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509. 
 413 A presumptive First Amendment right of access would not extend to proceedings or 
documents that are not material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power or to unfiled 
materials. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1984) (denying a First 
Amendment right of access to unfiled discovery material and noting that “[m]uch of the 
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially 
related, to the underlying cause of action”). 
 414 See, e.g., In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 
1162 (9th Cir. 1982); Associated Press v. Bell, 510 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1987); State ex rel. 
Repository v. Unger, 504 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio 1986) (per curiam). 
 415 See, e.g., In re Globe Newspapers Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983); State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1983). 
 416 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 417 See, e.g., In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989); Ex parte Birmingham 
News Co., 624 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). 
 418 See, e.g., In re Times-World Corp., 488 S.E.2d 677 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
 419 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 828 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ellis, 154 
F.R.D. 692 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 420 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 828 F.2d 340. 
 421 See, e.g., In re Wash. Post, 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 422 See, e.g., United States v. Milken, 780 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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and post-trial hearings relating to allegations of juror misconduct.423 In 
the rare instance when a court has not found a public right of access to a 
criminal proceeding, it has done so because secrecy plays a critical role 
in the proceeding in question and public access would “destroy[] the 
effectiveness” of the proceeding.424 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue 
of whether a First Amendment right of access extends to civil 
proceedings, it has noted that “historically both civil and criminal trials 
have been presumptively open.”425 Indeed, the Court has observed that 
“in some civil cases the public interest in access . . . may be as strong as, 
or stronger than, in most criminal cases.”426 Returning again to the case 
that opened the introduction to this Article, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection 
Plus, Inc., it is clear that this is no run-of-the-mill lawsuit. As the Third 
Circuit itself remarked, the case raised a matter of first impression in the 
circuit: whether the protections afforded under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act extend to women who have elected to terminate 
their pregnancies.427 How can the public know the extent and 
effectiveness of the nation’s anti-discrimination laws if it cannot see the 
application of these laws in specific cases? 
Recognizing the importance of public access to civil proceedings, 
most federal appellate courts already apply a First Amendment right of 
access to civil cases,428 as do a number of state supreme courts.429 For 
 
 423 See, e.g., United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 424 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that 
public access to a mid-trial inquiry into juror misconduct would “substantially raise the risk of 
destroying the effectiveness of the jury as a deliberative body”); United States v. Gonzales, 150 
F.3d 1246, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a right of access to Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 
proceedings and records because access would have a negative impact on the functioning of 
CJA process, given the importance of confidentiality to that process). Courts also have 
consistently held that there is no First Amendment right of access to grand jury proceedings. 
See, e.g., United States v. Index Newspapers L.L.C., 766 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“Because the grand jury is an integral part of the criminal investigatory process, these 
proceedings are always held in secret.”); In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search 
Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 410 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009) (“All grand jury 
proceedings . . . traditionally have been nonpublic.”). 
 425 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“A trial is a public event. What 
transpires in the court room is public property.”). 
 426 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979); see also Publicker Indus., Inc. 
v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Public access to civil trials, no less than criminal 
trials, plays an important role in the participation and the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”); Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975) (“Civil litigation 
in general often exposes the need for governmental action or correction. Such revelations 
should not be kept from the public.”). 
 427 Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 363 (3d Cir.), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
 428 See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014); Grove Fresh 
Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994); Republic of Philippines v. 
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example, a unanimous California Supreme Court concluded that 
extending a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings was 
fully in keeping with United States Supreme Court precedent: 
“Although the high court’s opinions in Richmond Newspapers, Globe, 
Press-Enterprise I, and Press-Enterprise II all arose in the criminal 
context, the reasoning of these decisions suggests that the First 
Amendment right of access extends beyond the context of criminal 
proceedings and encompasses civil proceedings as well.”430 
The majority of federal circuits also have held that a First 
Amendment right of access attaches to court records submitted in 
connection with criminal proceedings,431 as have several state supreme 
courts.432 Many courts also recognize a First Amendment right of access 
 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 
1987); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker 
Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 1059; In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Iowa 
Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983); Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th 
Cir. 1983). Only the D.C. Circuit has held to the contrary. See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[N]either this Court nor the Supreme 
Court has ever indicated that it would apply the Richmond Newspapers test to anything other 
than criminal judicial proceedings.”). 
 429 See, e.g., NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 
1999); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1107–08 (D.C. 1988); Barron v. Fla. Freedom 
Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988); Roman Catholic Diocese of Lexington v. Noble, 92 
S.W.3d 724, 733 (Ky. 2002); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1990); 
Rapid City Journal v. Delaney, 2011 SD 55, 804 N.W.2d 388. 
 430 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc., 980 P.2d at 358. 
 431 See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 710 (11th Cir. 1993); Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 283 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 
(8th Cir. 1988); In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Storer Commc’ns, 
Inc., 828 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 
1987); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 
753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985); Associated 
Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983). The Tenth Circuit has avoided 
deciding whether there is a First Amendment right of access to criminal and civil court records. 
See, e.g., Riker v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 315 F. App’x 752, 756 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Even 
assuming, without deciding, that there is a First Amendment right to court documents, that 
right is not absolute. . . . [A]ny interest Mr. Jordan has is outweighed by the safety needs of Mr. 
Riker.”); United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[F]or the purposes of 
this opinion, we assume without deciding that access to judicial documents is governed by the 
analysis articulated in Press-Enterprise II.”). 
 432 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 543 A.2d 284, 285 (Conn. 1988); Oahu Publ’ns Inc. v. Ahn, 331 
P.3d 460, 485 (Haw. 2014); Commonwealth v. Doe, 648 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Mass. 1995), 
abrogated by Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182 (Mass. 2014); In re VV Publ’g Corp., 577 
A.2d 412, 417–18 (N.J. 1990); Nichols v. Jackson, 2002 OK 65, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 1044, 1046; State v. 
Archuleta, 857 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1993); Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. v. Lee 
Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, 332 P.3d 523, 530 (Wyo. 2014). 
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to records in civil proceedings.433 In fact, it makes little sense to treat 
court proceedings and court records differently under the First 
Amendment, given that trials and other courtroom proceedings make 
up only a small portion of the work of the courts.434 Moreover, 
excluding court records from the First Amendment’s reach would 
significantly diminish the benefits of public access. As the Third Circuit 
remarked in United States v. Antar: 
Access to the documentation of an open proceeding . . . facilitates the 
openness of the proceeding itself by assuring the broadest 
dissemination. It would be an odd result indeed were we to declare 
that our courtrooms must be open, but that transcripts of the 
proceedings occurring there may be closed, for what exists of the 
right of access if it extends only to those who can squeeze through 
the door?435 
B.     Evaluating Countervailing Interests 
The presumptive right of public access described above would be a 
qualified right. As the Supreme Court has made clear, even a First 
Amendment right of access can be denied when the countervailing 
interests supporting closure are sufficiently compelling. Although the 
Supreme Court has used slightly different wording when evaluating 
 
 433 See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014); Newsday L.L.C. v. Cty. of 
Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2013); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 86, 
93 (2d Cir. 2004); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc., 24 F.3d at 897; Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion 
Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993); Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253; In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. 
Litig., 732 F.2d at 1309; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1177; Ex parte Capital 
U-Drive-It, Inc., 630 S.E.2d 464, 469 (S.C. 2006). But see In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331–40 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding no First Amendment right to 
discovery materials); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 908 
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (“With respect to the question whether the common law right to inspect and 
copy [discovery materials] has a constitutional dimension, we conclude that it does not.”). 
 434 See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93 (warning that “the ability of the public and 
press to attend civil and criminal cases would be merely theoretical if the information provided 
by docket sheets were inaccessible”); Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 
897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[A]ll of the documents filed with the court, as well as the transcript 
of the proceeding itself, are maintained as the official ‘record’ of what transpired.”). This is the 
approach taken by the American Bar Association, which has promulgated standards 
recommending that there should be a public right of access to “all judicial proceedings, related 
documents and exhibits, and any record made thereof,” subject to specific narrowly defined 
circumstances. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-5.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). In the 
commentary to an earlier version of the standards, the ABA stated that its position was 
intended to conform to the Supreme Court’s recognition in Richmond Newspapers of a First 
Amendment-based right of access premised on the “‘structural’ design of the Constitution to 
guarantee a self-informed citizenry.” STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.2 cmt. at 23 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 1991). 
 435 38 F.3d 1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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restrictions on access—sometimes requiring that closure be “essential to 
preserve higher values”436 and at other times stating that restrictions 
must be “necessitated by a compelling governmental interest”437—the 
test otherwise matches the Court’s strict scrutiny test as applied in other 
First Amendment contexts.438 
Strict scrutiny essentially involves a two-part, “ends and means” 
inquiry.439 A court must first make a normative judgment about the 
ends: Is the interest in closure important enough to justify the 
restriction on public access? If so, the next step involves a “primarily 
empirical judgment about the means.”440 As Eugene Volokh notes, “If 
the means do not actually further the interest, are too broad, are too 
narrow, or are unnecessarily burdensome, then the government can and 
should serve the end through [alternative means].”441  
If a court concludes that public access may be restricted, it must 
then articulate specific on-the-record findings justifying its 
conclusion.442 As the Supreme Court instructed in Press-Enterprise I: 
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an 
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 
The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough 
that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was 
properly entered.443 
Given the wide variety of disputes that come before the courts, it 
should come as no surprise that court proceedings and records are 
awash with private and sensitive information about the litigants, 
witnesses, jurors, and others who come into contact with the court 
system. For example, information ranging from bank account numbers 
to details about an individual’s past sexual activity can appear in court 
files raising, among other concerns, the risk of identity theft and 
 
 436 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) (“[P]roceedings cannot be closed unless 
specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve 
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 
U.S. 501, 510 (1984))). 
 437 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982) (“Where . . . the 
State attempts to deny the right of access . . . it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by 
a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”). 
 438 See, e.g., Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that “strict scrutiny is the correct standard” to be applied in access disputes 
governed by the First Amendment). 
 439 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996). 
 440 Id. at 2419. 
 441 Id. 
 442 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 443 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2017  6:33 PM 
914 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:835 
 
reputational harm.444 For businesses and other organizations, court 
proceedings may disclose trade secrets and other confidential business 
information that can lead to substantial economic harm.445 For the 
government, information disclosed in court proceedings and records, 
such as the names of confidential informants and descriptions of 
intelligence gathering techniques, can potentially harm national security 
or undermine law enforcement efforts.446 Moreover, public access to 
criminal proceedings and records can result in significant prejudice to a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.447 
The full list of interests that public access might implicate is too 
long to recount here, but judges can find guidance in evaluating these 
interests by reviewing the extensive body of precedent applying strict 
scrutiny in public access and other First Amendment contexts.448 In 
Press-Enterprise I, for example, the Supreme Court applied strict 
scrutiny to the closure of voir dire proceedings.449 In that case the trial 
judge asserted two interests in support of his closure orders: “[T]he right 
of the defendant to a fair trial, and the right to privacy of the prospective 
jurors.”450 The Court found little reason to question the lower court’s 
conclusion that these interests were compelling, noting that “the right of 
an accused to fundamental fairness in the jury selection process is a 
compelling interest.”451 As to the interest in juror privacy, the Court 
stated that “[t]he jury selection process may, in some circumstances, 
give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when 
interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has 
legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.”452 
 
 444 See, e.g., Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 33, at 1835–50 (identifying 140 distinct types of 
sensitive information in court records). 
 445 See, e.g., Kyle J. Mendenhall, Note, Can You Keep a Secret? The Court’s Role in Protecting 
Trade Secrets and Other Confidential Business Information from Disclosure in Litigation, 62 
DRAKE L. REV. 885 (2014). 
 446 See Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., The Potential for Injustice in the Use of Informants in the 
Criminal Justice System, 37 SW. L. REV. 1079, 1082–83 (2008). 
 447 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356–61 (1966) (discussing the prejudicial 
impact of pretrial publicity and a judge’s duty to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to 
a fair trial). 
 448 Although the origin of the strict scrutiny test is obscure, the Supreme Court’s first 
application of a compelling interest requirement in the First Amendment context occurred as 
early as 1958 in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial 
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1279 (2007) (noting the first appearance of a compelling 
interest test in Speiser and concluding that “it is certainly fair to say that before the 1964 
McLaughlin [v. Florida] decision, First Amendment free speech cases had begun to develop 
both a vocabulary and a set of doctrinal ideas that would shortly coalesce into the modern strict 
scrutiny test”). 
 449 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
 450 Id. 
 451 Id. 
 452 Id. at 511. 
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Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the trial court’s closure orders 
were improper because they were “unsupported by findings showing 
that an open proceeding in fact threatened those interests.”453 
Gerald Gunther famously declared that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in 
theory and fatal in fact.”454 Yet the test has not proven to be an 
insurmountable obstacle in First Amendment cases. In a comprehensive 
empirical study of all strict scrutiny cases in federal courts from 1990 
through 2003, Adam Winkler found that government regulation of 
speech survived strict scrutiny in twenty-two percent of the cases.455 
Moreover, in the context of public access to court proceedings and 
records, Winkler found that fifty percent of closure orders survived 
strict scrutiny.456 According to Winkler’s study, the courts uniformly 
permitted restrictions on access to grand jury proceedings and 
restrictions designed to protect minors.457 By contrast, Winkler found 
that courts were “relatively hostile to denials of access to ordinary 
criminal proceedings and records.”458 
Some court proceedings and records will undoubtedly remain 
closed under this new presumptive First Amendment test while others 
will have to be open. Grand jury proceedings, for example, will likely 
stay closed because secrecy is integral to the grand jury’s screening and 
investigatory functions.459 Many juvenile delinquency proceedings, on 
the other hand, will have to be open unless closure is justified on a case-
by-case basis, a situation that a number of juvenile justice reformers 
have argued for.460 
This case-by-case consideration of the interests closure advances is 
one of the primary benefits of a presumptive right of access under the 
 
 453 Id. at 510–11. 
 454 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 455 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 844 (2006). 
 456 Id. at 849. 
 457 Id. (finding that courts allowed the restriction in 100% of the cases he reviewed). 
 458 Id. at 850 (finding that courts allowed the restriction in only sixteen percent of the cases). 
 459 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (“[T]he proper functioning of our grand 
jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings” (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. 
Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979))); United States v. Index Newspapers L.L.C., 766 
F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Because the grand jury is an integral part of the criminal 
investigatory process, these proceedings are always held in secret.”). 
 460 See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: 
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1120–29 (1991); Emily 
Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be 
Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 192–93 (1999); Kelly Crecco, Note, Striking a 
Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children's Privacy Interests in Juvenile Dependency 
Hearings, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 490, 525–32 (2013); see also Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the 
Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 54 (2001) (asserting that 
public access can check the shortcuts and abuses in juvenile dependency proceedings). 
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First Amendment. Under the current experience and logic test, the 
public is foreclosed from accessing entire classes of court proceedings 
and records because they fail the threshold test for a First Amendment 
right of access. Under the proposed test, courts will have to evaluate 
each closure and sealing independently to determine whether the 
interests supporting closure are compelling and whether the means 
chosen to limit access are narrowly tailored. Some court proceedings 
and records will—and should—remain closed, but wholesale closures 
will no longer be the norm. 
C.     Expanding Access to the Courts 
As courts consider how to implement a right of access, they should 
remain cognizant that many of the benefits that flow from public access 
can only be achieved if the public actually takes advantage of this access. 
Not everyone, of course, can or even desires to attend court proceedings 
in person. In our nation’s early history, attending trials was a common 
mode of “passing the time.”461 Today, most people rely on surrogates, 
particularly the media, to inform them about the work of the courts.462 
The courts, like many parts of the government, are in the midst of a 
transformation from the paper-based world of the twentieth century to 
an interconnected, electronic world where physical and temporal 
barriers to information are eroding. Over the past decade, courts across 
the country have been moving with alacrity to digitize their records and 
make them available to the public online.463 A number of courts have 
also adopted or are considering adopting other forms of electronic 
access to their records and courtrooms. For example, Kansas and Utah 
amended their court rules in 2012 to allow some observers to use cell 
phones and laptop computers to report from their courtrooms.464 
The move to allow electronic access to the courts has brought, and 
will continue to bring, substantial benefits to the public and to the 
courts themselves.465 The committee of judges and attorneys that 
 
 461 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1834 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 
Little, Brown & Co. 1976). 
 462 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
(“Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth 
from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic 
media.”). 
 463 See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 33, at 1826. 
 464 See Cathy Packer, Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones and 
Computers in Court? An Examination of the Arguments, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573, 591 
(2013). 
 465 See KEVIN P. KILPATRICK, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE ELECTRONIC 
HANDSHAKE: PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT DATABASES 1–3 (1995) (describing how electronic 
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drafted Utah’s amended rule wrote that “[p]ermitting electronic media 
coverage will allow the public to actually see and hear what transpires in 
the courtroom, and to become better educated and informed about the 
work of the courts.”466 Similarly, in Kansas the preface to the amended 
rules states that “electronic devices are redefining the news media” and 
that future court policies 
should include enough flexibility to take into consideration that 
electronic devices have become a necessary tool for court observers, 
journalists, and participants and continue to rapidly change and 
evolve. The courts should champion the enhanced access and the 
transparency made possible by use of these devices while protecting 
the integrity of proceedings within the courtroom.467 
Electronic access to court proceedings and records makes it 
possible for the benefits of court transparency to be widely dispersed 
throughout society.468 By facilitating remote access to the court system 
and its records, many more people can stay informed—and inform their 
fellow citizens. Electronic access also has a leveraging effect because it 
makes it possible for the media and other interested parties to cover 
court proceedings at a lower cost and allows for greater depth of analysis 
at a time when many media organizations are cutting back on the 
number of reporters assigned full-time to the courts.469 
 
public access systems can aid court administrators); J. DOUGLAS WALKER, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, ELECTRONIC COURT DOCUMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT AND DATA INTERCHANGE TECHNOLOGY 15 (1999) (“With the nearly continuous 
rise in volume and complexity of the paperwork involved in the judicial process . . . technology 
and electronic communications could offer a better alternative to the flood of paper forms and 
documents.”). 
 466 STATE OF UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL STUDY COMM. ON TECH. BROUGHT INTO THE 
COURTROOM, FINAL REPORT 11 (2012), http://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/docs/20120501_
130338_utah_camerasreport.pdf. 
 467 KAN. SUP. CT. R. 1001(a). 
 468 See, e.g., Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial 
Accountability with Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access 
Policies and a Proposal for South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. REV. 81, 91 (2006) (noting 
that a “frequently mentioned benefit” of electronic access to court records is that it responds “to 
the needs of South Dakota’s rural court users, that is, [it] ‘levels the geographic playing field’ by 
allowing persons located in great distances from the courthouse to access public information” 
(citation omitted)). 
 469 Lucy Dalglish, former executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, highlighted the important role that court records play for the media in testimony before 
the Privacy Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on the Federal Rules: 
We are in a situation where there are a lot fewer journalists in mainstream news 
organizations. By having easy access to this information, they are able to do a better 
job of reporting the news to the public. There are some jurisdictions—probably not 
Manhattan, but certainly in places like Utah—where you have many local 
newspapers and really only one federal court that covers an enormous geographic 
area. Now they are able to accurately and completely report news stories as well. 
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The movement by courts to increase electronic public access, 
however, has not escaped criticism from those who worry that such 
efforts will result in privacy harms due to the widespread disclosure of 
sensitive and private information.470 As a result, court administrators, 
judges, lawyers, and legislators are in active discussion about how to 
navigate the transition to electronic public access, with some 
recommending a substantial curtailment of public access through 
redaction of electronic and print records, restricted public access to 
court proceedings, removal of categories of court records from Internet 
access, and increased filing of court documents under seal.471 
The debate over how to balance public access and secrecy is an 
important one, but it cannot be resolved based on abstract assessments 
of the benefits and harms associated with public access to court 
proceedings and records. As courts consider how best to implement a 
First Amendment right of access to the courts, it will be essential that 
they keep in mind the structural values advanced by public access and 
the need to ensure that information about the courts is widely circulated 
so that the benefits of public access can be realized. 
CONCLUSION 
Information is power. If citizens are the ultimate sovereigns, as the 
Constitution presupposes, they must have access to the information 
necessary to evaluate the actions of their government. This fundamental 
principle underlies the First Amendment’s structural role as a facilitator 
of democratic control. Because the courts sit at the critical interface 
where government power is contested, defined, and actualized, public 
 
Symposium, Panel One: General Discussion on Privacy and Public Access to Court Files, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13 (2010). 
 470 See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Pleadings, Privacy and Ethics: Protecting Privacy in Litigation 
Documents, 2 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 25 (2012); Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy 
and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. 
L. REV. 772 (2012); Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 283, 301 (2003); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and 
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002). 
 471 See, e.g., Natalie Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records—Balancing Public Access 
and Privacy, 51 LOY. L. REV. 365 (2005) (recommending the use of protective orders and 
sealing to remove from public view high risk data elements and describing some states’ 
decisions to exclude categories of court records from online systems); Kristin A. Henderson, 
Lessons from Bankruptcy Court Public Records, 23 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 55, 73, 76–77 
(2004) (proposing the redaction of sensitive information from bankruptcy court records 
accessible to the public through electronic case files); Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, 
Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to 
Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 969–78 (2009) (recommending redaction of names of 
cooperating defendants and other informants). 
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access to the courts is essential to both the functioning and legitimacy of 
our republican system of government. 
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia that “[i]n guaranteeing freedoms 
such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as 
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to 
those explicit guarantees.”472 Yet the Supreme Court never finished the 
work it began in Richmond Newspapers. It never resolved the question 
of whether the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and 
pre-trial proceedings extended to civil proceedings and to court records. 
Moreover, in the intervening years, the Court’s access decisions 
obscured the rationale for a First Amendment right of access and put 
the lower courts on a path to a doctrinal dead end. 
This Article puts the First Amendment right of access back on a 
firm theoretical foundation by focusing on the structural role the First 
Amendment plays in our constitutional system. In doing so, it provides 
a principled way to distinguish a right of public access to the courts 
from a general right of access to government information. As described 
above, the courts play a unique structural role in society that makes a 
right of public access to the information they contain particularly 
compelling from the standpoint of self-governance. 
This is a critical time to clarify the basis and scope of a First 
Amendment right of access to the courts because the courts are in the 
midst of a transformation from the largely paper-based world of the 
twentieth century to an interconnected, electronic world where physical 
and temporal barriers to information are diminishing. Because of these 
changes, a debate over how to balance public access and secrecy is 
taking place in courtrooms and legislatures across the country. As 
courts consider how best to implement a First Amendment right of 
access to the courts, it will be essential that they keep in mind that public 
access serves a preeminent value in our society: democratic self-
governance. 
 
 472 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
